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Abstract 
This EUDO CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate discusses whether the widespread legal rule of ius 
sanguinis, through which citizenship is transmitted at birth from parent to child, can still be justified in 
the contemporary world. Together with addressing more traditional objections to ius sanguinis, such as 
its alleged ethno-nationalist character or its negative effects on the global distribution of wealth and 
opportunities, the debate also looks into more recent challenges to ius sanguinis, such as those posed 
by dramatic changes in family norms and practices and the rapid development and spread of 
reproductive technologies. One major worry is that current forms of ius sanguinis are unable to deal 
adequately with uncertainties related to the establishment of legal parentage, especially in cross-border 
surrogacy arrangements. Whereas most contributors agree that ius sanguinis should be reformed in 
order to adapt to contemporary circumstances, plenty of disagreement remains as to how this reform 
should be done. The debate also tackles the questions of whether and in what way ius sanguinis could 
be justified as a normative principle for admission to citizenship. Authors discuss important normative 
considerations, such as the need to prevent statelessness of children, to ensure the preservation of 
family life and to provide opportunities for intergenerational membership. 
Kickoff contribution and rejoinder by Costica Dumbrava. Comments by Rainer Bauböck, Jannis 
Panagiotidis, Scott Titshaw, Kristin Collins, Lois Harder, Francesca Decimo, David Owen, Kerry 
Abrams, David de Groot, Iseult Honohan, Eva Ersbøll, Ana Tanasoca, Katja Swider and Caia Vlieks. 
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Kick off contribution 
Bloodlines and belonging: Time to abandon ius sanguinis? 
Costica Dumbrava* 
The transmission of citizenship status from parents to children is a widespread modern practice that 
offers certain practical and normative advantages. It is relatively easy to distribute legal status to 
children according to parents’ citizenship, especially in the context of high mobility where the links 
between persons and their birthplace are becoming increasingly strained. Granting citizenship status to 
children of citizens may also be desirable as a way of avoiding statelessness, acknowledging special 
family links and fostering political links between children and the political community of their parents. 
These apparent advantages of ius sanguinis citizenship are, however, outweighed by a series of 
problems. In what follows I argue that ius sanguinis citizenship is (1) historically tainted, (2) 
increasingly inadequate and (3) normatively unnecessary. Ius sanguinis citizenship is historically 
tainted because it is rooted in practices and conceptions that rely on ethno-nationalist ideas about 
political membership. It is inadequate because it becomes increasingly unfit to deal with contemporary 
issues such as advances in assisted reproduction technologies and changes in family practices and 
norms. Lastly, ius sanguinis citizenship is normatively unnecessary because its alleged advantages are 
illusory and can be delivered by other means. 
Tainted 
As a key instrument of the modern state, the institution of citizenship has been closely linked to 
nationalism. Ius sanguinis citizenship was reintroduced in Europe by post-revolutionary France, which 
sought to modernise French citizenship by discarding feudal practices such as ius soli.
1
 Whereas in 
modern France the adoption of ius sanguinis was premised on the idea of a homogenous French 
nation, in countries with contested borders, such as Germany, ius sanguinis played a key role in 
maintaining ties with co-ethnics living outside borders and thus in nurturing claims to territorial 
changes. Although ius sanguinis citizenship is not conceptually ‘ethnic’ (in the same sense in which 
ius soli citizenship is not necessarily ‘civic’), there are a number of ways in which the application of 
the ius sanguinis principle has been used in order to promote ethno-nationalist conceptions of 
membership. 
Firstly, the application of unconditional ius sanguinis in the context of a long history of emigration 
means that emigrants can pass citizenship automatically to their descendants regardless of the strength 
of their links with the political community. No less than twenty countries in Europe maintain such 
provisions.
2
 Whereas one can find several non-nationalist arguments for justifying emigrants’ 
citizenship, these weaken considerably when applied to successive generations of non-residents. 
Secondly, there are cases in which countries rely on the principle of descent in order to confirm or 
restore citizenship to certain categories of people whom they consider to be linked with through ethno-
cultural ties. Apart from cases where ethnic descent is an explicit criterion of admission (e.g. in 
Bulgaria, Greece), there are countries where ethnicity is camouflaged in the language of legal 
restitution or special duties of justice (e.g. in Latvia, Romania). In this way, persons can have their 
citizenship status ‘restored’ on the basis of descent from ancestors who had been citizens or residents 
in a territory that once belonged, even if briefly, to a predecessor state with different borders. 
                                                     
* Maastricht University. 
1 Weil, P. (2002). Qu' est-ce qu'un Français? Paris: Grasset. 
2 Dumbrava, C. (2015). Super-Foreigners and Sub-Citizens. Mapping Ethno-National Hierarchies of Foreignness and 
Citizenship in Europe. Ethnopolitics 14(3), 296-310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2014.994883  
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Thirdly, the combination of unconditional ius sanguinis citizenship with the reluctance to accept 
alternative ways of incorporating children of residents (such as ius soli) is also a strong indicator of an 
ethnic conception of citizenship, especially in the context of a long history of immigration. Convoluted 
attempts to adopt and expand ius soli provisions in Germany and Greece illustrate this point. In 2000 
Germany adopted ius soli provisions
3
 but maintained that, unlike persons who acquire German 
citizenship through ius sanguinis, those who acquire citizenship via ius soli could retain it only if they 
relinquish any other citizenship before their 23rd birthday.
4
 In 2011 the Greek Council of State halted 
an attempt to introduce ius soli citizenship in Greece
5
 by claiming that ius sanguinis is a superior 
constitutional principle whose transgression would lead to the ‘decay of the nation’.6 
Inadequate 
Consider the following two real cases. 
Samuel was born in November 2008 in Kiev by a Ukrainian surrogate mother hired by Laurent and 
Peter, a married gay couple of Belgian and French citizenship respectively.
7
 Samuel was conceived 
through in vitro fertilisation of an egg from an anonymous donor with Laurent’s sperm. Upon his birth 
and according to practice, the surrogate mother refused to assume parental responsibility and thus 
transferred full parentage rights to Samuel’s biological father. When Laurent requested a Belgian 
passport for Samuel, the Belgian consular authorities refused on grounds that Samuel was born 
through a commercial surrogacy arrangement, which was unlawful according to Belgian law. After 
more than two years of battles in court, during which Laurent and Peter also attempted and failed to 
smuggle Samuel out of Ukraine through the help of a friend pretending to be Samuel’s mother, a 
Brussels court recognised Laurent’s parentage rights and ordered authorities to deliver Samuel a 
Belgian passport. With it, Samuel was able to leave Ukraine and settle with Laurent and Peter in 
France. 
In 2007 Ikufumi and Yuki, a married Japanese couple, travelled to India and hired Mehta as 
surrogate mother for their planned child.
8
 Using Ikufumi’s sperm and an egg from an anonymous 
donor, the Indian doctors obtained an embryo, which they then implanted in Mehta’s womb. Only one 
month before the birth of Manji, the resulting child, Ikufumi and Yuki divorced. When Ikufumi 
attempted to procure a Japanese passport for Manji, the Japanese authorities refused on grounds that 
Manji was not Japanese. According to the Japanese Civil Code, the mother is always the woman who 
                                                     
3 Hailbronner, K. and A. Farahat (2015). Country Report: Germany. EUDO Citizenship Observatory. 
http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/34478/EUDO_CIT_2015_02-Germany.pdf?sequence=1 
4 Bock, L. (2015). Germany: As ‘Option Duty; reform comes into force, first figures on individuals having lost their 
citizenship emerge. Citizenship News, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-
news/1342-germany-as-option-duty-reform-comes-into-force-first-figures-on-individuals-having-lost-their-citizenship-
emerge 
5 Christopoulos, D. (2011). Greek State Council strikes down ius soli and local voting rights for third country nationals. An 
Alarming Postscript to the Greek Citizenship Reform. Citizenship News, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. http://eudo-
citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/444-greek-state-council-strikes-down-ius-soli-and-local-voting-rights-for-third-
country-nationals-an-alarming-postscript-to-the-greek-citizenship-reform  
6 The Greek parliament has recently pushed forward another proposal regarding ius soli in an attempt to overcome the 
deadlock. See Christopoulos, D. (2015). Greece: New citizenship bill now opened for public consultation. Citizenship 
News, EUDO Citizenship Observatory. http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/1385-greece-new-citizenship-
bill-now-opened-for-public-consultation  
7 The European Parliament (2013). A comparative study on the regime of surrogacy in EU Member States. Study for the 
Directorate-General of Internal Affairs, Policy Department: Citizen’s Rights and Constitutional Affairs, pp. 90-1. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/474403/IPOL-JURI_ET(2013)474403_EN.pdf 
8 Points, K. (2009). Commercial surrogacy and fertility tourism in India: The case of Baby Manji. Case Study, Kenan 
Institute for Ethics, Duke University. https://web.duke.edu/kenanethics/CaseStudies/BabyManji.pdf 
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gives birth to the child. Despite having three ‘mothers’ – a genetic mother, who contributed with the 
egg, an intended mother who later declined involvement, and a surrogate mother, who did not plan to 
take up parental responsibilities – Manji had no obvious legal mother. Indeed, Manji’s Indian birth 
certificate mentioned Ikufumi as the father but left the rubric concerning ‘the mother’ blank. After 
much legal wrangling Manji was issued a certificate of identity stating that she was stateless, with 
which Ikufumi managed to take her to Japan. 
These are just two of a growing number of cases that test the legal and normative linkage between 
human reproduction, legal parentage and citizenship. Not only do they question conventional 
assumptions about the biological and cultural basis of citizenship, but they also show the limits of the 
principle of ius sanguinis in ensuring the adequate determination of citizenship status. 
The incongruity between reproduction, legal parentage and citizenship is not an issue triggered 
solely by advances in reproductive technologies. Traditionally, children born out of wedlock could not 
acquire the father’s citizenship through descent. Many countries still maintain special procedures for 
the acquisition of citizenship by children born out of wedlock to a foreign mother and a citizen father. 
In most cases this implies submitting a request for citizenship after parentage is legally established, 
although in Denmark these children can acquire citizenship only if the parents marry. In the Czech 
Republic and the Netherlands (for children older than 7), the determination of parentage for the 
purpose of citizenship attribution requires showing evidence of a genetic relationship between the 
father and the child. As argued by the European Court of Human Rights in its 2010 judgment on 
Genovese v Malta,
9
 the differential treatment of children born within and out of wedlock with respect 
to access to citizenship amounts to discrimination on arbitrary grounds. This practice is also at odds 
with contemporary trends that indicate an impressive surge in births out of wedlock; the share of such 
births in the EU27 rose from 17% of total births in 1990 to 40% in 2013.
10
 
One of the biggest challenges to ius sanguinis citizenship comes from the spread of assisted 
reproduction technologies (ART). About 5 million babies worldwide have been born through ART 
since the birth of Louise Brown, the first ‘test-tube baby’, in 1978.11 ART have developed rapidly 
generating a multi-billion dollar market in assisted reproduction. A significant share of this market 
involves the international movement of doctors, donors, parents, children and gametes. In order to 
avoid legal restrictions or to cut costs, a growing number of infertile men and women, usually from 
high-income countries, travel to destinations such as India, Thailand or Ukraine in order to have ‘their’ 
babies conceived through in vitro fertilisation procedures using sperm or eggs (or both) donated by 
people from places such as Spain or Romania. 
Many problems arise because the international market for assisted reproduction is not properly 
regulated, which means that national regulations often conflict with one another. Countries that oppose 
surrogacy consider the surrogate mother as the legal mother even if they are not genetically related to 
the child. According to this reasoning, the husband of the surrogate mother is the presumed father of 
the child. However, countries that encourage surrogacy usually recognise the intended mother and 
father as the legal parents, regardless of whether they are genetically related to the child. As the stories 
on Samuel and Manji show, when these two approaches collide the children risk becoming, as Justice 
Hedley put it, ‘marooned, stateless and parentless’.12 
                                                     
9 Genovese v. Malta, Application no. 53124/09, European Court of Human Rights, 11 October 2011. 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106785#  
10 BBC News (2013). Two in five EU babies born out of wedlock. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-21940895  
11 The European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (2014). ARTs fact sheet. 
http://www.eshre.eu/Guidelines-and-Legal/ART-fact-sheet.aspx  
12 Re: X & Y (Foreign Surrogacy), [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 (U.K.). 
 http://www.familylawweek.co.uk/site.aspx?i=ed28706  
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In some cases intended parents have the possibility to establish parentage and citizenship for their 
children born through surrogacy. However, such special arrangements often discriminate between 
(intended) mothers and fathers. For example, in the US children born to surrogate mothers outside the 
country are treated as children born out of wedlock, so fathers can be recognised as legal parents and 
therefore extend citizenship to children if they provide proof of a genetic relationship with the child 
(through a DNA test). Intended mothers, however, cannot be recognised as mothers even if the child 
was conceived using their eggs and even if they are married to the intended father.
13
 It follows that, in 
cases where another woman’s womb is involved, paternity and citizenship can still follow the sperm 
but not the eggs. 
The practice of gamete donation has become increasingly accepted and regulated, so donors are in 
principle discharged of parental responsibilities with regard to children they help to conceive. 
However, it is not always clear what counts as donation. In a recent US case, a man successfully 
claimed parentage with regard to a child who was born after an informal agreement in which he agreed 
to ‘donate’ sperm to a friend. The Court decided in the man’s favour arguing that his act did not count 
as donation because the procedure used in the insemination did not involve ‘medical technology’ (they 
used a turkey baster). The ultimate test of paternity in this case relied on a mere technicality, which 
can hardly be seen as a morally relevant fact for establishing fundamental ties of filiation and 
citizenship.
14
 
The development of ART is likely to further complicate questions about parentage and citizenship. 
The new techniques of embryo manipulation, for example, make now possible the transfer of a cell 
nucleus from one woman’s egg to the egg of another, which means that the resulting child will have 
three genetic parents. Advances in technologies for freezing gametes and embryos raise questions 
about the rights and responsibilities over future births and about the status of future children. There 
have already been a number of cases of posthumous conception in which the sperm or eggs of a 
deceased person were used by the spouse or another relative in order to conceive children. For 
example, it was recently reported that a 59 years old woman from the UK gave birth to ‘her’ 
daughter’s child.15 These practices raise obvious questions as to whom these children belong to and 
they may as well trigger issues of citizenship. Lastly, progress has been made on the creation or 
‘artificial’ gametes through the modification of other types of human cells. Apart from opening 
possibilities for bypassing the heterosexual model of procreation,
16
 these techniques raise concerns 
about abuse or reproductive ‘crime’. Imagine a world in which it would be possible to create a child 
from a tissue sample collected from somebody’s cup of coffee. Those famous actors and footballers 
would probably think twice before shaking their fans’ hands. 
Unnecessary 
One could argue that the main problems do not lie with ius sanguinis citizenship but with the 
determination of legal parentage. Once we solve issues related to legal parentage, then the ius 
sanguinis principle will effectively address citizenship matters. However, this view ignores that 
dilemmas regarding the attribution of parentage are often triggered or complicated by citizenship (and 
migration) issues. It can also be argued that relying solely on legal parentage to settle citizenship 
                                                     
13 Deomampo, D. (2014). Defining Parents, Making Citizens: Nationality and Citizenship in Transnational Surrogacy. 
Review of Medical anthropology. Published online: 25 September 2014. 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01459740.2014.890195 
14 Brandt, R. (2015). Medical intervention should not define legal parenthood. Bionews. 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page.asp?obj_id=523229&PPID=523190&sid=282 
15 Smajdor, A. (2015). Can I be my grandchild's mother? BioNews. http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_504476.asp  
16 Shanks, P. (2015). Babies from Two Bio-Dads. Biopolitical Times, Center for Genetics and Society. 
http://www.biopoliticaltimes.org/article.php?id=8418  
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issues disregards fundamental normative questions about who should be a citizen in a political 
community. 
Despite much liberal-democratic talk about social contract, democratic inclusion and active 
citizenship, the overwhelming majority of people in the world acquire citizenship by virtue of 
contingent facts about birth (descent or place of birth). While ius soli citizenship has received 
considerable political and academic attention recently due to pressing concerns about the inclusion of 
children of immigrants, ius sanguinis continues to be taken for granted. In the remainder of this essay, 
I briefly challenge two main theoretical defences of ius sanguinis: (a) that ius sanguinis citizenship 
recognises and cements the special relationship between the parent and child; (b) that ius sanguinis 
citizenship ensures the intergenerational stability of the political community. 
The main problem of ius sanguinis citizenship is that it is parasitic on external factors concerning 
the legal determination of parentage. As one of the examples presented above shows, it may only take 
a choice between a petri dish and a turkey baster to make somebody a parent and hence a supplier of 
citizenship status. The relevance of horizontal family ties between spouses in citizenship matters has 
largely diminished, as a flipside of the spread of gender equality norms, since in liberal states wives no 
longer automatically acquire their husbands’ citizenship. By contrast, parental ties continue to remain 
paramount for the regulation of citizenship. Even if there are good reasons for seeking to ensure the 
swift transfer of citizenship from parents to children (e.g. to prevent statelessness), this approach is 
questionable because it renders children vulnerable. Ius sanguinis citizenship makes access to 
citizenship for children dependent on parents’ legal status, actions or reproductive choices. 
As in the case of spouses, joint citizenship adds little to the legal and normative character of the 
parent-child relationship. There is little doubt that the law should treat children and the parent-child 
relationship with special attention. However, this could and should be achieved regardless of the 
citizenship status of children and parents. One could, for example, extend the legal rights associated 
with parentage and filiation (e.g. conferring full migration rights to children of citizens) or seek to 
establish a universal status of (legal) childhood that confers fundamental right and protection to 
children regardless of their or their parents’ citizenship or migration status. 
The second argument for ius sanguinis citizenship is that the automatic transition of membership 
status from parents to children ensures the smooth reproduction of the political community. As 
children of citizens grow, they become socialised in the political community of their parents and 
develop political skills necessary for furthering their parents’ project of democratic self-government, 
skills that they will eventually pass on to their own children. An easy objection to this view is that it is 
empirically naïve, especially in the context of increased migration and diversification of family 
practices. Citizenship is thus based on a contested expectation. Instead of granting citizenship ex-ante 
to persons who are likely to develop desirable citizenship attitudes and skills, we could delay the 
attribution of citizenship until such attitudes and skills are confirmed. Alternatively, there may be 
other normative considerations for turning children into citizens. For example, being born in the 
country and/or living there at a young age makes children not only subject to the law of the country 
but also highly dependent on the state, which, for example, is required to provide regular and reliable 
access to medical care such as vaccinations. These considerations could justify granting children at 
least provisional citizenship. 
The intergenerational dimension of democratic membership can hardly be achieved by relying on 
legal fictions or on biological contingencies. Our efforts should rather be channelled towards 
consolidating democratic institutions and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills among all those 
who find themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reasons, in our political community. As for 
the children who happen to be born here, we should treat them as political foundlings and give them 
all the care and support they need to become full political members. 
 6 
Ius filiationis: a defence of citizenship by descent 
Rainer Bauböck* 
Aristoteles famously defined a citizen as someone ‘giving judgment and holding office’ in the polity.1 
Yet, this does not settle the issue since we first need to know who qualifies for holding office. And so 
he continues: ‘For practical purposes a citizen is defined as one of citizen birth on both his father’s and 
his mother’s side’.2 Times have changed. From the French Revolution, which revived ius sanguinis, 
until the second half of the 20th century, citizenship was mostly transmitted only from the father to the 
child. Today, largely as a result of international conventions against the discrimination of women, all 
democratic states define a citizen as one of citizen birth on either the father’s or the mother’s side. Yet 
ius sanguinis remains the dominant rule for acquisition of citizenship worldwide. True, in the 
Americas the stronger principle is ius soli, the acquisition of citizenship through birth in the territory. 
But even there those born abroad to citizen parents who were themselves born in the country are 
recognized as nationals by birth. 
Given this overwhelming presence of ius sanguinis in nationality law, Costica Dumbrava’s call for 
abandoning it is bold. Some might even say, it is quixotic, but I disagree. It is indeed time to reflect on 
the future of ius sanguinis and to abandon it as a doctrine linking citizenship to biological descent. Yet 
there are good practical and normative reasons why the principle of citizenship transmission from 
parents to children will remain alive and ought to be retained. 
Dumbrava runs three main attacks against ius sanguinis: It is tainted by its association with ethno-
nationalism; it is inadequate because, in an age of artificial reproduction technologies, same sex 
marriage and patchwork families, biological descent no longer traces social parenthood; and it is 
unnecessary since its protective effects can be achieved by other means. I will accept the first and 
second argument with some modifications but reject the third. 
Not the only one tainted 
As Dumbrava points out, modern ius sanguinis was seen as a democratic and revolutionary principle 
in contrast with ius soli that had its origins in the feudal idea that any person (or animal) born on the 
territory was subject to the ruler of the land. Deriving citizenship from citizen descent rather than 
territorial birth made it possible to imagine a self-governing people reproducing itself. Dumbrava is of 
course right that seeing the nation as a community of shared descent across generations made it also 
easier to justify the exclusion of foreigners as well as the inclusion of co-nationals across the border. 
Yet this is not a sufficient reason for abandoning ius sanguinis. 
First, an ethnonationalist disposition can be overcome while maintaining ius sanguinis if this 
principle is supplemented with ius soli and residence-based naturalisation. The latter has created an 
ethnically highly diverse citizenry in continental European immigration countries even in the absence 
of the additional inclusionary effects of ius soli. The reason for this ethnically inclusive effect of ius 
sanguinis is simple: If first generation immigrants have access to citizenship and take it up, then ius 
soli and ius sanguinis does not make much difference: the children of immigrants will be citizens 
under either rule. 
Secondly, a pure ius soli regime is also tainted and not only because of the feudal origins of the 
principle. Territorial nationalism can be just as nasty as ethnonationalism and may be fanned by 
                                                     
* EUDO CITIZENSHIP co-director, European University Institute. 
1 Aristotle (1962). The Politics. Transl: T.A. Sinclair, revised and commentary: J. Saunders ed. London Penguin, III. i: 169 
2 ibid, III.ii: 171-2, original emphasis. 
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thinking of ius soli as the right of the ‘sons of the soil Even the case of Romania that Dumbrava lists 
among the problematic ones is ambiguous in this regard. If Romania awards citizenship to the 
descendants of those born in its lost territories, is this an instance of ius soli or ius sanguinis and an 
illustration of ethnic or of territorial nationalism? The answer is probably: both. Ius soli and ius 
sanguinis are therefore not alternatives, but can be combined in benign ways that neutralise the 
potentially illiberal effects of either principle, as well as malign ways that enhance their nationalist 
potential for ethnic exclusion and territorial expansion. 
Thirdly, pure ius soli also has vicious exclusionary effects for migrants. In most American states, 
the immigrant generation 1.5 – those who have entered the country as minor children – cannot acquire 
citizenship before the age of majority. President Obama’s Dream Act is an attempt to mitigate some of 
the worst consequences for the children of irregular immigrants. Even more problematic is the 
common distinction between nationals and citizens in many Latin American states (see the new 
American country profiles on EUDO CITIZENSHIP). Only those born in the territory are considered 
nationals (they are sometimes also called ‘naturals’). They turn into citizens with full voting rights at 
the age of majority. Immigrants who naturalise become citizens, but not nationals. They remain 
excluded from many public offices (also the US president still has to be a ‘natural born citizens’) and 
they can be deprived of their citizenship status, whereas nationality can often never be lost. In 
Uruguay even the concept of ‘naturalisation’ does not exist because those who are not born in the 
territory can never become ‘naturals’. Similar exclusionary effects of ius soli traditions apply to those 
born abroad to citizen parents. They often do not acquire citizenship unless they are registered in time 
by their parents and they may lose it unless they ‘return’ before the age of majority. 
If both ius sanguinis and ius soli are tainted in these ways, should we consider an even more radical 
alternative of abandoning citizenship by birth altogether? Why not replace it with ius domicilii so that 
citizenship is acquired automatically with taking up residence and lost with outmigration? Or should 
we maybe replace it with ius pecuniae,
3
 i.e. a global market for citizenships in which individuals can 
bid for membership status anywhere and states can set the admission price? Neither of these 
alternatives is morally attractive and something important is lost when we give up birthright 
citizenship. 
Why not ius filiationis? 
Dumbrava’s second argument is that developments in reproduction technologies and in the social and 
legal recognition of new family patterns make ius sanguinis increasingly unworkable and obsolete. 
This problem is not entirely new and a solution is already available. International law has long 
abandoned the idea that children should acquire only one citizenship at birth. Since they can inherit 
two different citizenships from the mother’s and the father’s side (maybe in addition to a third one 
acquired iure soli), why should they not receive the citizenship of both an intended and a surrogate 
mother or an intended father and a sperm donor? Asking the question makes it already clear that the 
problem is not the multiplicity of citizenships per se, but the mismatch between biologically 
determined citizenship and parental care arrangements that would also open the door to abusive 
claims. The traditional solution that is already available in most nationality laws for cases where the 
biological parent is not the social parent is transmission of citizenship through adoption.
4
 Why should 
                                                     
3 Stern, J. (2011). Ius Pecuniae – Staatsbürgerschaft zwischen ausreichendem Lebensunterhalt, Mindestsicherung und 
Menschenwürde. Migration und Integration – wissenschaftliche Perspektiven aus Österreich, Jahrbuch 1/2011, 
Dahlvik/Fassmann/Sievers (eds.). See also the EUDO CITIZENSHIP forum ‘Should citizenship be for sale?’ (2013); 
Dzankic, J. (2015). Investment-based citizenship and residence programmes in the EU. EUI Working Papers RSCAS 
2015/08. EUI: Florence. 
4 See the EUDO CITIZENSHIP modes of acquisition database: http://eudo-citizenship.eu/databases/modes-of-acquisition 
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it not be possible to generalise this model from the marginal case of adoption so that a modified ius 
sanguinis refers to social rather than biological parenthood (as it already does in several jurisdictions)? 
The main issue with such a new ius filiationis might be that determination of citizenship is less 
automatic than it used to be for children born in wedlock to their biological mother and father. Yet 
states that are committed to the welfare of children have to figure out anyhow how to determine legal 
parenthood in the more complex family arrangements of contemporary societies. In order to avoid 
statelessness it is important that every child obtains at least one citizenship immediately at birth. And 
in order to make sure that children are not caught between conflicting legal norms and can develop 
stable relations to their countries of citizenship, it is important that their citizenship status does not 
change automatically when they become part of a new family. If these concerns are taken into account 
through a combination of ius soli with legally determined initial parenthood, what objections can be 
raised against recognizing primary caregivers as well as persons with additional custodial rights as 
legal parents who can transmit their citizenship to the child? 
Don’t abandon the children! 
Dumbrava’s third argument is that ius sanguinis is not necessary because children’s rights can be 
protected through other means. He claims that ius sanguinis renders children vulnerable by making 
their ‘access to citizenship … dependent on parents’ legal status, actions or reproductive choices This 
is indeed a reason why the children of immigrants need ius soli as an independent right to citizenship 
in their country of birth. Unfortunately, in the US, their birthright citizenship does not prevent them 
from being deported together with their undocumented parents, whereas immigrant minors who are 
EU citizens have a right to stay that protects also their primary caregivers from deportation.
5
 
Yet small children are in any case dependent on their parents’ migration decisions. This is a an 
equally strong reason why they also have a claim to share their parents’ citizenship, since they risk 
otherwise to remain stranded in their country of birth or be treated as foreigners in their parents’ 
country of nationality. Dumbrava suggests preventing this by ‘conferring full migration rights to 
children of citizens’. But would migration rights become more secure if they are disconnected from 
the legal status of citizenship that is the only one obliging states to unconditionally admit them? 
Alternatively, he suggests to ‘establish a universal status of (legal) childhood that confers fundamental 
rights regardless of their or their parents’ citizenship or migration status’. This is what the Children’s 
Rights Convention, which is one of the mostly widely signed and ratified human rights documents, 
aims to do. The question is not only whether states are willing to respect these rights, but whether they 
can be held responsible for protecting them. For this, children need not only human rights, they also 
need their parents’ citizenship. 
Delayed citizenship for all? 
Dumbrava has, however, a much more fundamental objection that targets both ius sanguinis and ius 
soli: Citizenship as membership in a political community should not depend on ‘contingent facts of 
birth (descent or place of birth)’. This is a common critique that always leaves me puzzled.6 My very 
existence depends on these contingent facts. Humans cannot will themselves into being but are thrown 
into the world without choosing where to be born and to which parents. What is morally arbitrary is 
not that states use these fundamental features of personal identity to determine membership in political 
                                                     
5 Case C-200/02 Zhu and Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004; Case C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano v 
Office National de L'emploi, 2011. 
6 For nuanced critiques of birthright citizenship based on this idea see Carens, J. H. (2013). The Ethics of Immigration. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Shachar, A. (2009). The Birthright Lottery. Citizenship and Global Inequality. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
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communities, but that in our world citizenship provides individuals with hugely unequal sets of 
opportunities. This is not an inherent feature of birthright citizenship but of the global economic and 
political (dis)order. If we want to overcome it, we have to address the causes of global inequality 
directly instead of attributing them to those rules that make individuals equal in status and rights as 
citizens of a particular state. 
Dumbrava’s critique focuses, however, on another birthright puzzle that has bothered republican 
theorists. Shouldn’t membership in a self-governing political community be based on consent? And 
does it not presuppose certain attitudes and skills that first need to be developed?
7
 We may expect that 
children who are born and grow up in the state territory or who are raised by citizen parents will 
eventually want to join the political community and will also acquire the skills required for political 
participation. Yet these are expectations rather than certainties. Dumbrava suggests therefore that ‘we 
could delay the attribution of citizenship until such attitudes and skills are confirmed’. However, since 
children also depend on the state for their health and education, he adds that they could at least be 
granted provisional citizenship. The Latin American distinction between nationality acquired at birth 
and citizenship acquired at majority seems to approximate this idea. 
One reading of Dumbrava’s proposal is that this is just a terminological distinction harking back to 
Aristotle’s two definitions of citizenship. If we consider as citizens those who ‘give judgments and can 
hold office’, i.e. the members of the demos, then children are indeed only provisional citizens but will 
automatically become full citizens at the age of majority. The other interpretation draws, however, a 
line between the two statuses that can only be crossed by demonstrating the right attitude and skills. 
Instead of naturalising immigrants into a birthright community, this community itself would be 
denaturalised and reconstituted through a citizenship test imposed on all provisional native citizens. It 
may seem a form of poetic justice to treat natives like immigrants. Yet there is a big difference 
between expecting and promoting citizenship attitudes and skills and making them a requirement for 
access to citizenship rights. The only reason why immigrants can be expected to spend a few years as 
residents before becoming citizens, which gives them time to develop citizenship skills, and to apply 
for naturalisation, which demonstrates a civic attitude, is that they are birthright citizens of another 
state who have grown up there. 
Citizenship across generations 
Dumbrava concludes by suggesting that the intergenerational continuity of democratic membership 
should be achieved through consolidating institutions and educating citizens rather than the legal 
fictions and biological contingencies of birthright citizenship. One might ask why democracies need 
intergenerational continuity. The answer leads us back to the original justification for ius sanguinis 
after the French Revolution. It should not be the rulers who determine who the citizens are, nor the 
citizens themselves through some democratic procedure in which they decide whom to admit or reject, 
nor the mere fact of subjection to the laws due to temporary presence in the territory. All of these rules 
lead to too much contingency and discontinuity with regard to the composition of the citizenry. 
Promoting civic attitudes and skills among those who are citizens is important, but it cannot resolve 
the puzzle who has a claim to be a citizen in the first place. Automatic acquisition of membership at 
birth and for life sets this question aside. It makes citizenship a part of citizens’ personal identities that 
they are like to accept. And it allows democracies to tap into resources of solidarity and to promote a 
sense of responsibility towards the common good and future generations. 
In a nutshell, these are my two arguments why a modified version of ius sanguinis should be 
accepted as necessary for democratic states: 
                                                     
7 See Dumbrava, C. (2014). Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-Cultural Belonging, Preferential Membership Policies in 
Europe. Houndmills Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, chapter 8, 9. 
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In a world of territorial states that control immigration, ius sanguinis (or ius filiationis) is as 
indispensible as ius soli for protecting the children of migrants. It provides them with the right to stay 
and to be admitted in their country of birth as well as their parents’ country of origin. No other legal 
status can secure these rights as well as a birthright to dual nationality. 
Deriving citizenship from unchosen and permanent features of personal identity – where and to 
whom one is born – sets aside the politically divisive membership question for the vast majority of 
citizens, creates a quasi-natural equality of status among them and signals that membership is linked to 
responsibilities for the common good and for future generations. No citizenship education programme 
can fully substitute for these signalling effects of birthright citizenship.  
 11 
Tainted law? Why history cannot provide the justification for abandoning ius sanguinis 
Jannis Panagiotidis* 
In his thought provoking piece, Costica Dumbrava rejects ius sanguinis as 1) historically tainted, 2) 
increasingly inadequate and 3) normatively unnecessary. In my response, I will mainly focus on the 
first, historical dimension. Drawing on examples from the case of Germany, often used as the prime 
example to show what is wrong with ius sanguinis, I will contest the idea that ius sanguinis as such has 
been discredited by history.  
Regarding the second and third points, I will restrict myself to the following brief observations, 
which are broadly in line with Rainer Bauböck’s comments: while the issue of ART and citizenship 
raised by Dumbrava is indeed intriguing, I would go along with his own observation that this is more 
about the determination of legal parentage than about ius sanguinis, and with Bauböck’s emphasis on 
social rather than biological parenthood. Discarding the ius sanguinis principle due to certain specific 
cases it might not adequately cover would mean throwing the baby out with the bathwater.  
I am also simultaneously intrigued and sceptical regarding the suggestion to introduce a sort of ‘a-
national’, universal status for children. Against the backdrop of recent historical research into children 
as the object of nationalist contestation and agitation during the first half of the twentieth century, a 
scenario in which ‘children belonged more rightfully to national communities than to their own 
parents’, this idea appears intuitively attractive.1 Having said that, one can turn the argument around 
and see the suggested disconnection of parent and child citizenship as another attempt to claim 
children from their parents, this time on behalf on an imaginary inter- or supranational community. 
Yet in a world still (and for the foreseeable future) structured by nation states, where most so-called 
human rights are in fact citizens’ rights, one may indeed wonder about the benefits of such a status 
‘above’ or perhaps ‘beyond’ the nation if the parents cannot enjoy similar rights.  
Tainted by history? 
As to the argument of ius sanguinis being historically tainted, Dumbrava first of all needs to be 
commended for recognising that ‘ius sanguinis citizenship is not conceptually “ethnic” (my emphasis, 
J.P.). Nevertheless, he argues that ‘there are a number of ways in which the application of the ius 
sanguinis principle has been used in order to promote ethno-nationalist conceptions of membership’. 
These include 1) the maintaining of emigrant citizenship beyond the first generation of emigrants; 2) 
the use of ‘the principle of descent in order to confirm or restore citizenship to certain categories of 
people whom [states] consider to be linked with through ethnocultural ties’; and 3) the exclusion of 
immigrant children from citizenship by an exclusive use of ius sanguinis with no ius soli elements.  
Regarding the third point, I fully agree with Bauböck that it can be remedied quite easily by 
combining these two principles of citizenship allocation and simultaneously allow for residence-based 
naturalisation. The first issue is similarly unproblematic: extra-territorial transmission can simply be 
interrupted at a certain generational stopping point, much like the rule Germany introduced in section 
4, paragraph 4 of its reformed 1999 citizenship law regarding the non-acquisition of German 
citizenship by the offspring of German citizens who themselves were born abroad after 31 December 
                                                     
* Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien (IMIS), University of Osnabrück. 
1 Zahra, T. (2008). Kidnapped Souls: National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands, 1900-1948. 
Ithaca: Cornell UP, 3; See also: Zahra, T. (2011). The Lost Children: Reconstructing Europe's Families after World War 
II. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 20. 
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1999.
2
 There is no rule that says that the transmission of citizenship to descendants has to be possible 
ad infinitum. 
Not all types of ‘descent’ are the same 
I would like to discuss the second point in more detail, which touches upon the topics of preferential 
membership policies and co-ethnic citizenship and migration.
3
 Here we are dealing with a 
terminological confusion quite typical for much of the literature in this field. The ‘ethnic descent’ that 
Dumbrava mentions as a criterion of admission to citizenship in some cases and the descent implied in 
the ius sanguinis principle are not the same and should not be conflated. In fact, they are mutually 
exclusive: ‘descent’ in ius sanguinis is about descent from a citizen, whatever his or her ‘ethnicity’. 
The ‘ethnic descent’ used as a criterion in some cases of co-ethnic inclusion is precisely about people 
who are not citizens.  
The supposed historical taintedness of the ius sanguinis principle results from the conflation of 
these different types of ‘descent’, and of the related unhappy connotations of the term ‘blood’, which 
invokes associations of ‘race’. A lot of this confusion was created in the Brubaker-inspired debates of 
the 1990s about German citizenship. In a telling example, political scientist Patricia Hogwood claimed 
that ‘the concept and law of citizenship in Germany were originally formulated in the context of 
nation-state development based on cultural or ‘völkisch’ nationalism. … The fact that the German 
legal framework for citizenship and naturalisation remains firmly rooted in the jus sanguinis principle 
has meant that citizenship policy in Germany is inextricably entangled in concepts of ethnicity and 
race. … The principle of legal privilege [for ethnic Germans] on the basis of racial origins smacks of 
the racial policies of the Nazi period …’ (my emphasis, J.P.).4 
Yet ius sanguinis per se has nothing to do with ‘ethnicity’ and ‘race’. As Dieter Gosewinkel 
pointed out in his important book on German citizenship, the ‘blood’ here is a ‘formal and 
instrumental’ notion, not to be confused with ‘substantial’ blood conceptions of racial biology.5 Those 
only entered German citizenship law through the Nazi Nuremberg laws. Before, a German Jew, whom 
the Nazis would later construe to be of a different ‘race’ for having the wrong ‘blood’, would transmit 
his German citizenship to his children iure sanguinis, just like other Germans whom the Nazis would 
construe as ‘Aryans’. Ius sanguinis is ethnicity-blind. In fact, when young Israelis nowadays claim 
German citizenship with reference to an ancestor who fled from Germany, they also do so iure 
sanguinis. I would find it hard to interpret this as an objectionable völkisch practice. This example 
shows that the problem is not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the respective contexts in which it is 
embedded.  
Co-Ethnic citizenship is a different story 
Nor is ius sanguinis particularly useful (or even necessary) for the conveying of citizenship upon ‘co-
ethnics’ in other countries. This is a whole different discussion in my opinion which cannot be used to 
make a case against the ius sanguinis principle. Taking again the example of Germany, the main 
                                                     
2 Joppke, C. (2003). Citizenship Between De- and Re-Ethnicization. Russell Sage Foundation Working Paper No. 204, 12-
13. The full text of the law can be found at: http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/rustag/BJNR005830913.html 
3 Dumbrava, C. (2014) Nationality, Citizenship and Ethno-National Belonging: Preferential Membership Policies in 
Europe. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014; Jannis Panagiotidis, J. (2012) Laws of Return? Co-Ethnic Immigration 
to West Germany and Israel (1948-1992). PhD Diss., European University Institute. 
4 Hogwood, P. (2000). Citizenship Controversies in Germany: the twin legacy of Völkisch nationalism and the 
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. German Politics 9(3): 125-144, here 127, 132-133. 
5 Gosewinkel, D. (2001). Einbürgern und Ausschließen: Die Nationalisierung der Staatsangehörigkeit vom Deutschen 
Bund bis zur Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, 327. 
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European supplier of co-ethnic citizenship in past decades, it needs to be stressed that ‘ethnic 
Germans’ from Eastern Europe did not receive German citizenship by means of the ius sanguinis of 
the 1913 citizenship law. This was not possible, as in most cases they had no ancestor with German 
citizenship to refer to. Their claim to citizenship rested on special provisions in the constitution and 
expellee law, which equalised the status of German Volkszugehörige with that of German citizens.  
At this point we leave the solid ground of formal citizenship and enter into the murky territory of 
‘ethnicity’. But even here, it is not all about ‘descent’. While the peculiar notion of Volkszugehörigkeit 
is often identified with ‘ethnic descent’, it was much more complex than that: it was actually very 
much a political-plebiscitary notion predicated on self-avowal (Bekenntnis) as German to be 
confirmed by an ‘objective’ criterion, which could be language, descent, upbringing, or culture 
(section 6 of the 1953 Federal Expellee Law).
6
 ‘Descent’ (Abstammung) – notoriously hard to define 
in administrative practice – was thus neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for recognition as a 
German.
7
 
Conclusion 
In sum, I would argue that the supposed ‘taintedness’ of ius sanguinis has to do with issues not 
intrinsic to this principle of transmitting citizenship, namely restrictive admission practices and 
racially based exclusion. The issue of co-ethnic citizenship should be kept apart from this discussion 
altogether. History cannot provide the justification for abandoning ius sanguinis, as its use in certain 
problematic ways and contexts in the past does not mean it necessarily has to be used like that in the 
future. If complemented by other, inclusionary mechanisms of allocating citizenship in conjunction 
with increased tolerance for multiple citizenship it certainly remains a useful – and necessary – 
method of transmitting citizenship in the day and age of multiple transnational migrations. 
                                                     
6 See: http://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl153022.pdf  
7 I elaborate on the plebiscitary, quasi-’Renanian’ nature of the German conception of Volkszugehörigkeit in: Panagiotidis, 
J. (2012). ‘The Oberkreisdirektor Decides Who Is a German’: Jewish Immigration, German Bureaucracy, and the 
Negotiation of National Belonging, 1953–1990. Geschichte und Gesellschaft 38, 503-533, esp. 511. 
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Family matters: Modernise, don’t abandon, jus sanguinis 
Scott Titshaw* 
I appreciate the ideas that Costica Dumbrava and others have introduced into this debate. States’ 
concerns about the quality and political consequences of their citizenship are important. But 
citizenship is a two-way street. Our discussion of ius sanguinis laws should extend beyond the 
concerns of states to also consider the serious practical consequences of citizenship laws on citizens, 
including the long-term unity and security of their families. Families facing instability or separation 
because children are denied their parents’ citizenship are unlikely to be satisfied with the explanation 
that ius sanguinis is inadequate or historically tainted; the resulting individual sense of injustice might 
even discourage the loyalty and identification states seek in citizens.  
This debate about citizenship transmission is necessary because of two modern changes in the facts 
of life: (1) increased international mobility based on cheap and easy transportation and 
communication; and (2) the advent and diffusion of assisted reproductive technology (ART) and new 
legal family forms (e.g., same-sex marriage and different-sex registered partnership). I will address 
each in turn. First, I’ll explain why Dumbrava’s proposal to abandon the ius sanguinis principle is an 
undesirable response to increased international mobility. Second, I’ll build on Dumbrava’s and 
Bauböck’s recognition of the inadequacy of unlimited and exclusive ius sanguinis rules for today’s 
families by suggesting that ius sanguinis be modernised rather than abandoned altogether. I’ll also 
illustrate how citizenship in federal states can add an additional layer of complexity to any universal 
proposal regarding citizenship.  
 
In a mobile world children need their parents’ citizenship 
Dumbrava’s proposal to eliminate the ius sanguinis principle would increase, rather than decrease, 
problems based on greater international mobility. It would eliminate one tool parents currently use for 
transmitting citizenship to children conceived through ART. While current versions of ius sanguinis 
are inadequate to deal with other ART issues, that problem can be corrected. And, as Jannis 
Panagiotidis points out, abandoning ius sanguinis because of this inadequacy would be like ‘throwing 
the baby out with the bathwater’. Most children are still conceived through sexual reproduction rather 
than ART, and many of their families would be worse off without ius sanguinis.  
An example is easy to imagine. Let’s say an Indian couple moves every seven years for 
employment reasons. They obtain residence permits, but not citizenship, in South Africa, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, in turn. They also have a child in each country. Under ius soli 
regimes with no ius sanguinis rules, the children of these Indian parents would each have different 
passports (from South Africa, the UK, and the US). This might pose no problem in the short term. But 
what happens if a parent dies or loses his job?  
Under a ius sanguinis regime, the surviving family members would be able to enter India and 
remain there together permanently as citizens.
1
 
Dumbrava argues that such common citizenship is unnecessary to recognise and cement parent-
child relationships if children of citizens have ‘full migration rights But ‘migration rights’ or benefits 
are substantially less stable than citizenship rights. What if a non-citizen family member becomes 
                                                     
* Mercer University. 
1 India would have automatically recognised these children as Indian citizens through 2004; it still recognises a greatly 
eased path to apply for citizenship in this context. http://www.loc.gov/law/help/citizenship-pathways/india.php  
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deportable because he or she commits a crime?
2
 What if both Indian parents die while the children are 
minors? Without ius sanguinis, the children with their different nationalities might not be allowed to 
remain together anywhere, let alone in India where their extended family members (grandparents, 
aunts and uncles) most likely live.  
Dumbrava’s proposal of a universal legal status for all children would ameliorate some of these 
problems, but only until each child reaches the age of majority. At that time they might be separated 
from their parents and siblings.  
ART requires fixing family and citizenship law 
I agree with Dumbrava’s and Bauböck’s rejection of exclusive, unconditional ius sanguinis rules as 
inadequate in dealing with the consequences of ART and modern family law.  
I disagree, however, with the conclusion Dumbrava draws from his argument that ‘joint citizenship 
adds little to the legal and normative character of the parent-child relationship’. In fact, the 
permanence and stability stemming from common citizenship among close family members can have 
profound consequences for the unity required to develop and maintain family relationships.  
I also disagree with Dumbrava’s argument that ‘the main problem’ is that ius sanguinis ‘is parasitic 
on external factors concerning the legal determination of parentage’. In fact, some federal States 
already delink federal citizenship determination and state or provincial family law,
3
 creating greater 
problems than do citizenship laws that reflect legal parentage. In the United States, for example, legal 
parentage is generally a matter of state law. Yet, the US Constitution defines citizenship as an 
exclusively federal matter,
4
 and Congress has established and revised a complex, autonomous 
algorithm for determining when a citizen parent transmits US citizenship to a child born abroad.
5
 The 
problematic example Dumbrava points out regarding parents’ inability to transmit US citizenship to 
children conceived through ART was created by a misguided autonomous federal policy, not 
parentage determinations under family law.
6
 It could, and should, be corrected by federal 
reinterpretation of its rules to rely on family law parentage determinations.
7
 
                                                     
2 While hardship of citizen relatives is sometimes considered, US immigration law generally requires removal of non-
citizens who commit any of a long list of criminal infractions. 8 USC §1227(a)(2). 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/8/1227  
3 (2014). A Study of Legal Parentage and the Issues Arising from International Surrogacy Arrangements, Prel. Doc. No 
3C. Hague Conference on Private International Law,66-68 (listing Australia, Canada and the United States as examples). 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2015pd03c_en.pdf  
4 The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that ‘[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United State and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and the state in which they reside. Not only does this Amendment 
adopt a nearly absolute ius soli rule, but it clarifies that citizenship is a purely federal matter, with no meaningful state 
role beyond establishment of its own standards for recognising state residence.  
5 8 USC §§1401 - 1409. http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-29/0-0-0-
9696.html  
6 Under current US law, a genetic and legal father and/or one or more legal and ‘biological’ mothers (i.e., genetic and 
gestational mother(s)) transmit birthright citizenship to children conceived through ART, but non-biological parents do 
not. Titshaw, S. (2014). A Transatlantic Rainbow Comparison: ‘Federalism’ and Family-Based Immigration for Rainbow 
Families in the U.S. and the E.U. Rights on the Move: Rainbow Families in Europe, edited by Carlo Casonato & 
Alexander Schuster, 189, 194-9. http://eprints.biblio.unitn.it/4448/  
7 Titshaw, S. (2013). Revisiting the Meaning of Marriage: Immigration for Same-Sex Spouses in a Post-Windsor World. 
Vand. L. Rev. (66), 174-75 (2013). http://www.vanderbiltlawreview.org/2013/10/revisiting-the-meaning-of-marriage-
immigration-for-same-sex-spouses-in-a-post-windsor-world  
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Rather than misplaced reliance on family law, the problems Dumbrava and Bauböck describe 
regarding the application of ius sanguinis following ART are consequences of outdated family law or 
of international conflict-of-law issues where relevant jurisdictions define parentage differently.  
To the extent that the problems stem from conflict-of-law issues, it is worth noting that the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law is currently exploring whether to draft a multilateral 
instrument on international parentage and surrogacy, which might resolve some issues.
8
 
To the extent that the problems stem from outdated family law, the best solution is to fix the family 
law. Family law generally reflects a more individualized, in-depth understanding of parent-child 
relationships than do citizenship or migration laws. Based on long experience and empirical data, 
family law tends to favour the stability of permanent family relationships with commensurate duties 
and benefits in the best interests of children. By tending to ensure the same citizenship for children and 
their parent(s), ius sanguinis rules also generally promote stable solutions in the best interests of 
children in a way that less permanent migration rules do not.  
I agree with Bauböck that multiplicity of citizenships for children is generally not a problem, and I 
support his call for a more generous understanding of parenthood for purposes of citizenship 
transmission. But I would not opt for a ius filiationis proposal if it requires an entirely independent 
determination of social parenthood for citizenship transmission purposes. Officials dealing with 
citizenship issues are not as well suited to determine these issues as those administering family law. 
Also, too much generosity in this area might instigate cross-border mischief in familial disputes by 
‘social parents’.  
Instead, I would suggest replacing all outmoded rules that fail to consider parental intent and the 
best interests of the child in the context of children conceived through ART, whether these are family 
laws determining parentage or autonomous federal citizenship laws reading ius sanguinis as a literal 
‘right of blood’.  
                                                     
8 At: http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/gap2015pd03a_en.pdf  
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Abolishing ius sanguinis citizenship: A proposal too restrained and too radical 
Kristin Collins* 
Costica Dumbrava maintains that ius sanguinis citizenship is a historically tainted, outmoded, and 
unnecessary means of designating political membership. He argues that it is time to abandon it. His 
proposal is bold, and it has significant implications for an array of policies and practices. The parent-
child relationship not only serves as a basis for citizenship transmission; it also entitles individuals to 
immigration preferences, and – in some countries – it facilitates automatic or ‘derivative’ 
naturalisation of the children of naturalised parents. In many countries that recognize ius soli 
citizenship, the parent-child relationship serves as an added requirement: one must be born in the 
sovereign territory and be the child of a citizen or a long-term legal resident. Dumbrava limits his 
challenge to ius sanguinis citizenship per se, and even suggests that family-based migration rights 
could be used to minimise the disruptive effect of abolishing citizenship-by-descent. But his core 
complaints about ius sanguinis citizenship – the mismatch of biological parentage and political 
affinity, the difficulties of determining legal parentage – can be, and have been, levied against these 
various family-based preferences and statuses, which are likely found in every nation’s nationality 
laws. It is therefore important to consider his proposal in light of the role that the parent-child 
relationship plays in the regulation of migration, naturalisation, and citizenship more generally. With 
this broader context in mind, I concur with Rainer Bauböck and Jannis Panagiotidis that Dumbrava’s 
proposal rests on an under-informed assessment of the historical record. I also argue that that, as a 
remedy for the problems that he has identified, Dumbrava’s proposal is at once too restrained and too 
radical.  
The Complex History of Ius Sanguinis Citizenship 
Dumbrava first argues that ius sanguinis citizenship should be abolished because, historically, it has 
been associated with ethno-nationalist conceptions of citizenship. I appreciate Panagiotidis’ insistence 
that ‘the problem is not with ius sanguinis itself, but with the respective contexts in which it is 
embedded’.1 Panagiotidis also reminds us that ius sanguinis citizenship has sometimes functioned to 
create political communities that draw from different ethnic and religious groups, as in the case of 
German Jews whose membership in the German polity was secured by the country’s ius sanguinis 
laws prior to the Nazi era. I want to elaborate and underscore the importance of this point with an 
additional example from United States history: During seventy years of Chinese exclusionary laws, ius 
sanguinis citizenship provided one of the very few routes to entry, and to American citizenship, for 
ethnic Chinese individuals born outside the U.S. For precisely that reason, exclusionists sought to limit 
or repeal the ius sanguinis statute, which recognised the foreign-born children of American fathers as 
citizens.
2
 If one expands the historical frame to include parent-child immigration preferences and 
derivative naturalisation, the story becomes even more complex. By 1965, the race-based exclusions 
and national-origins quotas had been abolished, and previously excluded Asian families began 
                                                     
* Boston University School of Law. 
1 Jannis Panagiotidis, ‘Tainted law? Why History Cannot Provide the Justification for Abandoning Ius Sanguinis’, in 
EUDO Citizenship Forum.  
2 For a discussion of these laws and efforts to restrict the recognition of ethnic Chinese individuals under the ius sanguinis 
citizenship statute, see Kristin A Collins, K.A. (2014). Illegitimate Borders: Jus Sanguinis Citizenship and the Legal 
Construction of Family, Race, and Nation. Yale Law Journal 2134, 2170-2182. Starting in 1934, the ius sanguinis statute 
also allowed American mothers to transmit citizenship to their foreign-born children. See id. at 2157. 
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immigrating to the U.S. in unprecedented numbers.
3
 They were able to do so by relying on the 
generous family-based preferences in American nationality law, which facilitated entry, settlement, 
and – especially significant to this discussion – derivative naturalisation for children.4 
Even a cursory review of the historical record thus counsels a cautionary assessment of the 
contention that ius sanguinis citizenship’s tainted past justifies its abolition. First, calls to end ius 
sanguinis citizenship have their own ugly history. Second, although one cannot gainsay that, in certain 
circumstances, ius sanguinis citizenship has been used to maintain ethnic homogeneity, the notion that 
parents and children do and should share the same political affiliation has also facilitated racial, ethnic, 
and religious diversification of some political communities. Rather than abolish ius sanguinis 
citizenship wholesale, we should be alert to the ways that it can operate as a tool of ethnic exclusion 
and degradation in particular socio-legal contexts, and work to minimise those effects.
5
 
A Proposal Too Restrained and Too Radical 
To be fair, Dumbrava does not extend his proposal to migration and naturalisation policies that enlist 
the parent-child relationship; indeed, he would preserve such migration policies. He speaks only of 
traditional ius sanguinis citizenship, and argues that it often fails to map on to the reality of modern 
family formation, making it inadequate to ‘deal with contemporary issues such as advances in assisted 
reproduction technologies’ (ART), same-sex coupling and marriage, and the steady rise of nonmarital 
procreation. The problems Dumbrava identifies in this regard are important and difficult. But as a 
remedy for these problems, abolishing parent-child citizenship transmission is simultaneously too 
restrained and too radical. It is too restrained because, after abandoning ius sanguinis citizenship we 
would still be confronted with the difficulty of determining which parent-child relationships should 
count for purposes of regulating migration, derivative naturalisation, and (in many ius soli countries) 
birthright citizenship. Moreover, in all of these contexts, the ‘fundamental normative questions about 
who should be a citizen in a political community’ – and about the role that the parent-child 
relationship should play in that determination – would persist. 
At the same time, Dumbrava’s proposal is too radical. He argues that ius sanguinis citizenship is 
not necessary to protect children from statelessness and ‘adds little to the legal and normative 
character of the parent-child relationship’. On this point I agree entirely with Bauböck and Scott 
Titshaw that Dumbrava underestimates the disruptive potential of his proposal. If all countries 
recognised unrestricted ius soli citizenship, Dumbrava’s assertion that ius sanguinis citizenship is 
unnecessary to prevent statelessness would be basically correct. But, in fact, very few ius soli 
countries go that far. Instead, as noted, they use ius sanguinis concepts to restrict the operation of ius 
soli birthright citizenship, thus leaving some children at a risk of statelessness if traditional ius 
sanguinis citizenship were abolished. And it is not just formal statelessness that would increase in a 
world without ius sanguinis citizenship. Children whose citizenship does not align with that of their 
parents can find themselves divided by nationality from the individuals who are charged, ethically and 
legally, with their care. As Bauböck and Titshaw observe, in an era of voluntary and compelled 
migration, ius sanguinis is the most effective method of protecting against such destabilising and 
precarious circumstances.  
                                                     
3 See Reimers, D. (1983). An Unintended Reform: The 1965 Immigration Act and Third World Immigration to the United 
States. Journal of American Ethnic History 9(3): 23-24; Ong Hing, B. (1999). Making and Remaking Asian America 
Through Immigration Policy, 1850-1900. Stanford: SUP, 81-120.  
4 See, for example, Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 245, § 323. 
5 A particularly notable example of how ius sanguinis principles can operate as tools of ethno-racial exclusion is the 2013 
ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal of the Dominican Republic, TC/0168/13, which effectively expatriated ethnic-
Haitian individuals born and residing in the D.R., leaving hundreds of thousands of people stateless.  
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How to Modernise? 
I agree with Titshaw and Bauböck that the modernisation of ius sanguinis citizenship, rather than its 
complete repudiation, offers a better way to address the problems Dumbrava identifies. The difficult 
question is how? I am hesitant to embrace Titshaw’s proposed method of modernisation, and I offer a 
friendly but important amendment to Bauböck’s proposal.  
Titshaw argues that the officials who administer citizenship law should adhere to the parentage 
determinations made by officials who generally administer family law. In the U.S., these are state-
level family law judges applying state law. But domestic family law, in the U.S. and elsewhere, does 
not necessarily generate ideal or even tolerable outcomes on questions of citizenship. Titshaw holds up 
a particularly poorly drawn U.S. federal policy that regulates ius sanguinis citizenship as it applies to 
foreign-born children conceived using ART, but there are many examples of how the use of state 
family law to regulate citizenship transmission has generated equally objectionable outcomes.
 6
 
Alternatively, Bauböck would have us adopt a ‘ius filiationis’ standard that recognises the ‘social 
parent’ or the ‘primary caregiver’ as the parent for purposes of ius sanguinis citizenship. He urges that 
this would help remedy the ‘mismatch between biologically determined citizenship and parental care 
arrangements that would also open the door to abusive claims’.7 He is correct. My concern, however, 
is that his emphasis on ‘social parenting’ and ‘primary caregiving’ is insufficient and has its own 
perils. First, it could increase the likelihood of abusive denials of citizenship by officials who, at least 
in the U.S., are often all too eager to find reasons to reject claims to citizenship.
8
 In the case of 
nonmarital children – who make up a far greater portion of the global population than children 
conceived through ART – the restriction of parent-child citizenship transmission to ‘primary 
caregivers’ could lead to circumspect treatment, or outright rejection, of the father-child relationship 
as a basis for citizenship transmission. Indeed, the primary caregiver standard could stymie the 
caregiving efforts of unwed fathers who are divided by nationality from their children, and hence may 
never be able to establish themselves as the ‘primary caregiver’. The emphasis on caregiving as a 
prerequisite could also aid unwed fathers who prefer to avoid parental responsibility by distancing 
themselves geographically from their children. The result: a ius sanguinis citizenship regime that 
would buttress gender inequality by undermining men’s parental rights and helping them to avoid their 
parental responsibilities.
9
 Moreover, and regardless of one’s view of the equities as between parents, it 
is ultimately the nonmarital child’s citizenship and migration rights that could be destabilised, 
depending on how officials understood the concept of ‘social parent’. Dumbrava recognises the 
inequities associated with ‘the differential treatment of children born within and out of wedlock with 
respect to access to citizenship’, but his solution – to abolish parent-child citizenship transmission 
altogether – would give cold comfort to nonmarital children and marital children alike.  
This is not an endorsement for a purely genetic model of citizenship transmission. Despite the 
references to ‘blood’, ius sanguinis citizenship has never rested on purely biological conceptions of 
citizenship. Traditionally, marriage was fundamental to the ability of fathers to secure citizenship for 
their children, and – at least in the development of U.S. law – the presumption that the mother is the 
                                                     
6 For example, in 1940 the federal ius sanguinis citizenship statute was amended to include the nonmarital children of U.S. 
citizen fathers under certain circumstances, such as when the father had ‘legitimated’ the child. Federal officials turned to 
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determinations would not recognise an interracial marriage as the basis of a child’s citizenship claim if the father’s home 
state banned such marriages – and many did. See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n 2, at 2210. 
7 Rainer Bauböck, ‘Ius Fliationis: A Defence of Citizenship by Descent’, EUDO Citizenship Forum.  
8 See, for example, Saldana Iracheta v. Holder, 730 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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sole caregiver of the nonmarital child led to the recognition of the mother-child relationship as a 
source of citizenship for foreign-born nonmarital children.
10
 Rather, I suggest that – unless and until 
we move beyond citizenship as the enforcement mechanism for basic human rights, and beyond the 
family as a foundational source of material and psychological support for children, we cannot 
overstate the importance of the generous recognition of the parent-child relationship for citizenship 
transmission. The modernisation of ius sanguinis citizenship should thus include the recognition of 
‘social parents’ and parents with ‘custodial rights’– as Bauböck rightly asserts – and also recognition 
of all who can be held legally responsible for a child’s care or support. Dumbrava may be unhappy 
that the whims of parents, people’s reproductive choices, and factors beyond the control of the 
individual would continue to determine membership in a political community. But it is precisely 
because citizenship designations rest on factors such as these that I wholly agree with his admonition 
that we channel our efforts ‘towards consolidating democratic institution and promoting citizenship 
attitudes and skills among all those who find themselves, by whatever ways and for whatever reason, 
in our political community’. 
                                                     
10 See Collins, ‘Illegitimate Borders’, above n 2, at 2199-2205.  
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Citizenship without magic 
Lois Harder* 
I share Costica Dumbrava’s critique of ius sanguinis citizenship, and ultimately what is, I think, his 
rejection of birth as the basis for political membership generally. Of course, there are issues of 
practicality - of the world as we find it - that might limit whether and how one would advance the 
abolishment of birthright citizenship in light of specific political dynamics. But it is precisely those 
practicalities, and the near unthinkability of alternatives to birth-based citizenship that demand our 
interrogation of birthright in the first instance. As Joseph Carens has argued with respect to his 
advocacy of open borders, ‘even if we must take deeply rooted social arrangements as givens for 
purposes of immediate action in a particular context, we should never forget about our assessment of 
their fundamental character. Otherwise we wind up legitimating what should only be endured’.1 
In his contribution to this forum, Rainer Bauböck defends birthright citizenship and argues that in 
both of its iterations (ius sanguinis and ius soli) it avoids political division and ‘creates a quasi-natural 
equality of status’ among citizens who are entitled to claim it. But what about the inequality that 
divides the entitled from the unentitled? Political communities may be unavoidably bounded, but if a 
normative commitment to human rights is our guiding frame, it seems incumbent upon us to advance 
methods or prospects for membership that reduce the barriers to belonging as much as possible. 
Moreover, as Jacqueline Stevens trenchantly observes, in defining the bounds of equal citizenship, 
borders also form the boundaries of our non-emergency expressions of compassion.
2
 To the extent that 
birthright entitlement advances a seemingly unassailable claim to exclusionary membership, its 
advocacy runs counter to a broader commitment to humanitarianism.  
Bauböck’s description of birthright citizenship evades the fact that establishing citizenship through 
birth, as with any other basis for membership, is an inherently political decision. One of the central 
appeals of birthright is that it involves innocent, vulnerable babies, infants who are not (yet) marked 
by misdeeds, criminality, inadequate knowledge or commitment, or the wrong ideological proclivities. 
It is this innocence that helps to obscure the profoundly political basis of birthright; that makes it 
possible to describe birthright citizenship as avoiding political division and establishing a quasi-natural 
equality. However, the use of criteria of birth to determine political membership – whether it is birth to 
a citizen parent (variously defined) or birth in the territory (variously defined) – is not innocent. 
Prevailing views about 
 wedlock and patriarchal forms of social organisation (e.g. unwed mothers having responsibility 
for their children and conferring citizenship, but unwed fathers having no such responsibility or 
capacity); 
 the relative significance of biological and social parenting as well as gender and sexuality (can a 
lesbian co-mother confer citizenship on her genetic progeny to whom she did not give birth – 
just as fathers do?); 
 national attachment (is this child born abroad as second or subsequent generation?); and  
 how generous territorial definitions should be (is a child born to a Ugandan mother on an 
American airline flying in Canadian airspace from Amsterdam to Boston a Canadian? Answer = 
yes)
 3
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all play out in the rules that determine birthright entitlement. The magical power of birthright 
citizenship is that it makes it possible for us to know and rehearse these rules while simultaneously 
making birthright seem straightforward, static and apolitical. In contrast to citizenship debates that 
engage migration, legal and illegal status and naturalisation, birthright citizenship makes these 
political choices disappear with a wave of a wand.  
I am currently researching a book on the lost Canadians. These are people who thought they had a 
birthright claim to Canadian citizenship, but subsequently learned that they were mistaken. Their 
difficulties arose for various reasons, and have now largely been resolved through statutory 
amendment (a rule change). In making their case to Parliament, the courts and the media, their 
primary, and highly successful, strategy, was to denigrate the rule-boundedness of ‘mean-minded 
bureaucrats’ and advance the merits of their claims through appeals to lineage and blood-based 
belonging.
4
 Despite being born in the UK, residing in Canada for five years as a small child, and 
having subsequently lived in the UK for six decades, one such lost Canadian insisted, ‘I, sir, am a 
Canadian. To the roots of me, to the spirit of me, to the soul of me, I’m Canadian’. 5 This impassioned 
claim to Canada – not exactly your ‘go to’ example of an ethnic nation – nonetheless succeeds as a 
rhetorical strategy because it re-enchants the nation,
6
 underscoring the country’s desirability to the 
Canadian public, and insisting that this connection is an essential feature of her identity. This is a logic 
that only works in a world of birthright citizenship. And it is a strategy that eventually succeeded in 
securing legislative amendments, because the birth-based claims of the lost Canadians (and not 
necessarily residency or connection) carried an overwhelming political potency.  
To the extent that birthright citizenship enables progressive people to cordon off a substantial 
portion of membership determination from a potentially nasty political debate, one can certainly 
understand its attractions. But the occlusion of politics with an unsupportable appeal to nature is 
ethically dubious. If we are committed to democratic equality, we need principles to manage how we 
live together that refuse the privilege of birth over naturalisation, and that require us to come to terms 
with our mortality.
7
 Political membership should be a lively, on-going process of negotiation in which 
everyone has a stake. Some critics might argue that abandoning birthright citizenship and its 
intergenerational character will create the conditions for decision making in which we are no longer 
future-oriented, or indeed, that we will neglect the lessons and obligations of our past. If our children 
do not have a stake in the polity to come, why should we commit ourselves to making it better? This 
kind of argument is morally bereft. We can continue to care about the future and attend to the damages 
we, and our ancestors, have wrought, even if, or precisely because, our political membership is limited 
by our mortality. It was, of course, ever thus. 
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The Janus-face of ius sanguinis: 
protecting migrant children and expanding ethnic nations 
Francesca Decimo* 
Costica Dumbrava’s proposal for abandoning ius sanguinis is timely and bold. My intuition is to reject 
his suggestion that children’s citizenship might be disconnected from that of their parents, but to join 
his advocacy for a radical rethinking of the ius sanguinis principle with a view towards eliminating it 
once and for all. These are rather contrasting stances in relation to the same principle. Let us see if the 
apparent contradiction can be resolved. 
To begin, let us consider the element of Costica Dumbrava’s proposal that has elicited most 
attention and controversy among the respondents, but was picked up and expanded by Lois Harder, 
namely the assertion that granting citizenship at birth is unnecessary and, above all, that making 
children dependent on the legal status of their parents exposes them to a form of vulnerability. The 
idea of postponing the acquisition of citizenship until adulthood, taking into account birthplace and 
residence or possession of the appropriate attitudes and skills, derives from the classic opposition 
between ius sanguinis and ius soli according to which the former is considered ethnic and exclusive 
while the latter is considered civic and inclusive. Yet Rainer Bauböck’s comments on this point 
explain how, in the absence of parental transmission of citizenship to children, ius soli and ius 
domicilii can generate individual and familial conditions that are both legally paradoxical and morally 
unfair. 
I share the doubts and critiques raised by Rainer Bauböck, Scott Titshaw and Kristin Collins 
regarding the alleged emancipatory value of a citizenship system that disconnects children from their 
parents. Particularly, I consider any legal system that fails to specifically protect the relationship 
between parents and children to be highly risky. Indeed, who should children depend on if not their 
parents? Dumbrava’s proposal that children might instead be subject to, and protected by, a kind of 
international law faces the problem of subordinating the individual and familial reproductive spheres 
to institutional logics.  
As Luc Boltanski has noted,
1
 the event of birth is inextricably linked to the definition of belonging 
and social descent – and therefore legal, political, cultural, national, etc. descent as well. Historically, 
devices for legitimating the procreative event were provided by religion, ancestry, the nation-state and, 
in more recent times, a long-term relationship among a couple. In a scenario in which parentage and 
citizenship are not tightly connected from the beginning, the risk is not only that of generating 
stateless children but also an excess of state power. Even after World War Two, the Catholic Church 
in Ireland took children considered illegitimate away from their unmarried mothers. It was nationalist 
demographic policies, both in Europe and overseas, that shaped the reproductive choices of 
individuals and families during the 20th century with a view to producing children for the fatherland. 
We might recall these policies when interpreting some recent nationally-oriented arguments 
encouraging the children of immigrants to rid themselves of the burden of their cultures of origin in 
which their inadequately assimilated mothers and fathers remain stuck.
2
 With this in mind, do we 
really want to define children’s citizenship irrespective of their parents’? Do we really want to shift the 
task of determining the legitimate membership of our offspring from relationships to institutions? 
The considerations made thus far therefore lead me to agree with those who have argued that, as 
long as the system of nation-states regulates our rule of law, children’s citizenship must be linked from 
birth to that of their parents. 
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At the same time, it seems to me that ius sanguinis is a legal instrument which, especially in a 
global context of increased geographical mobility, opens the way to policies of attributing nationality 
that go far beyond protecting the parent-child relationship. This point relates to Dumbrava’s 
observation that ius sanguinis is historically tainted that was critically addressed by Jannis 
Panagiotidis but has not yet been decisively refuted.  
As scholars have noted, ius sanguinis makes it possible to recognise a community of descendants 
as legitimate members of the nation regardless of its territorial limits, but that is not all. This principle 
has been used to grant the status of co-national to individuals dispersed not only across space but also 
across time, leading to the construction of virtually inexhaustible intergenerational chains.
3
 This 
principle is based on blood, identified as the essential and primordial element of descent, belonging 
and identification. It is true that this potential for unlimited intergenerational transmissibility is 
effectively defused by the fact that many countries interpret ius sanguinis narrowly, applying it 
generally only up to the second generation born abroad. And yet, is this limit enough to bind and 
delimit the potential of ius sanguinis? In national rhetoric the image of a community of descendants 
continues to exert a powerful appeal that goes beyond the attribution of birthright citizenship. In 
historical emigration countries - but also others
 
-,
4
 ius sanguinis as a legal practice is used to grant 
preferential conditions and benefits to descendants as part of the direct transmission or ‘recovery’ of 
ancestral citizenship well beyond the second generation.
5
 Generational limits in the granting of 
citizenship to descendants can thus be bypassed because, in principle, ius sanguinis itself poses no 
particular restrictions in this regard. 
The most controversial aspects of ius sanguinis emerge when this principle ends up competing with 
ius soli or ius domicilii, that is, when individuals born and raised elsewhere enjoy a right to citizenship 
in the name of lineage and an assertion of national affiliation while immigrants who participate fully in 
the economic, social and cultural development of the country are denied this same right or face serious 
obstacles in accessing it. In such context — Germany in the past and Italy today – the right to 
citizenship effectively becomes a resource which, like economic, human and social capital, is 
distributed in a highly unequal way, benefitting certain categories of people – ‘descendants’ – at the 
expense of others – ‘foreigners’. 
In view of its unlimited intergenerational potential, I conclude that, if its purpose is merely to bind 
children’s citizenship to that of their parents, ius sanguinis as a legal instrument suffers from 
ambiguity and disproportionality. All of these critical points seem to be implicitly overcome in 
Bauböck’s proposal of a ius filiationis principle, which would focus entirely on linking children’s 
citizenship to that of their parents, especially for migrants and non-biological offspring. Under a 
different name and with distinct content, does this move not suggest that, rather than modifying or 
modernising ius sanguinis as advocated by Rainer Bauböck and Scott Titshaw, it is time to abandon it 
once and for all, adopting in its place a principle that explicitly protects parentage and citizenship in 
contexts of geographical mobility instead of linking it to genealogical lineage and nationhood?
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The prior question: What do we need state citizenship for? 
David Owen* 
In his kick-off contribution, Costica Dumbrava offers a threefold critique of ius sanguinis as a norm of 
citizenship acquisition. In reflecting on this critique, I share the scepticism expressed by Rainer 
Bauböck, Jannis Panagioditis, Scott Titshaw and Kristin Collins. In particular I would note, along the 
lines of Titshaw’s Indian family example, that the abolition of ius sanguinis would have led in my own 
family context to four siblings, of whom I am one, being split among three different nationalities: 
Nigerian, British and Malaysian). However rather than address Dumbrava’s critique head on, I want to 
suggest that the kind of critique of ius sanguinis that he offers – and the same point would apply to the 
critique or defence of any of the classic membership rules taken singly as free-standing norms – gets 
things moving askew from the start. To see this, one needs to take a step back and situate this debate 
within a slightly different context. When asking what citizenship rules we ought to endorse or reject, 
we ought to begin with a prior question: ‘what do we need state citizenship rules for?’  
In a world of plural autonomous states, there are two basic functions that such rules are to play:  
1. to ensure that each and every human being is a citizen of a state and hence that everyone has, at 
least formally, equal standing in a global society organised as a system of states; 
2. to allocate persons to states in ways that best serve the common interest, that is, where this 
allocation supports protection of the fundamental interests of individuals, the realization of the 
common good within states and the conditions of cooperation between states. 
A plausible response to these requirements is a general principle that Ayelet Shachar calls ‘ius nexi’ 
which highlights the importance of a genuine connection between persons and the state of which they 
are citizens.
1
 The notion of ‘genuine connection’ can be glossed in terms of Bauböck’s ‘stakeholder’ 
view which proposes that those and only those individuals have a claim to membership of a polity 
whose individual autonomy and wellbeing is linked to the collective self-government and flourishing 
of that polity.
2
 It seems to me that we should see ius soli, ius sanguinis and ius domicilii under the 
general principle of ius nexi as denoting different routes through which a genuine connection is 
presumptively established: through parental citizenship, through place of birth and through residence.  
Seeing each of these rules under this more general principle, rather than seeing each as a single 
free-standing norm, makes clear two points that are salient to this discussion. First, that in adopting 
any of these rules we are not reifying ‘blood’ or ‘territory’ or ‘residence’. We regard them instead 
simply as acknowledgments of the diverse ways in which ius nexi may be given expression – and we 
need each of them if we are to do justice to the relations of persons to states. Second, that each of the 
ius soli, ius sanguinis and ius domicilii rules should be qualified by the general principle of ius nexi 
that they serve. So, for example, an unlimited ius sanguinis rule or a ius soli rule that included a child 
born to visiting tourists or a ius domicilii rule that granted citizenship after three months residence 
would be incompatible with the overarching ius nexi principle. 
Still it would be in line with Dumbrava’s argument for him to object that the ‘birthright’ rules of 
ius soli and ius sanguinis can only operate on the basis of the general presumption that parental 
citizenship and place of birth establish a genuine connection, so why not wait until the children reach 
their majority? Here I concur with the view advanced by Bauböck that the adequate protection of 
children’s rights implies that ‘children need not only human rights, they also need their parent’s 
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citizenship’. Titshaw’s example of the serially mobile Indian family and my own peripatetic family 
history suffice to make this point. Contra Harder, I don’t think that ‘birthright’ rules disguise the 
political character of membership norms, rather they acknowledge important interests of children, 
parents and states. Harder’s stress on the relationship of those entitled to citizenship of a given state 
and those not so entitled doesn’t provide reasons to drop either ius soli or ius sanguinis, what it does is 
provide reasons for relatively generous ius domicilii rules, of rights to dual/plural nationality and of a 
more equitable distribution of transnational mobility rights.  
And perhaps there may be a clue here to an unstated background commitment of Dumbrava’s 
critique. If we ask under what, if any, circumstances in a world of plural states, it could make sense to 
abolish ius sanguinis rules, then I think that the only answer that has any plausibility is a world of open 
borders characterised by rapid access to citizenship through ius domicilii rules. It may even be 
plausible that the abolition of ius sanguinis rules would generate political support for more open 
borders given the problems liable to be posed for sustaining the human right to a family life after the 
removal of such rules. Whether this is a prudent way of seeking to realise such a world and whether 
such a world is desirable are, of course, further questions.  
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No more blood 
Kerry Abrams* 
Problems have plagued the ius sanguinis principle—the transmission of citizenship from parent to 
child— for as long as it has existed. Costica Dumbrava is surely correct that the time has come to ask 
whether ius sanguinis is still necessary. But the core problem with ius sanguinis, I would argue, is not 
that it uses the parent-child relationship to determine membership but that it overemphasizes the 
importance of the genetic tie to this relationship.  
The very term ius sanguinis —’right of blood’—makes the genetic tie the sine qua non of 
belonging. It is this obsession with genetic purity that has linked ius sanguinis to tribalism, 
xenophobia, and even genocide. This problem, I believe, is distinct from the very real need to ensure 
children’s access to the same geographic territory and legal system as that of their parents. Rainer 
Bauböck’s proposal for a ‘ius filiationis’ based on family association rather than genetic ties would 
excise many of the problems caused by a focus on blood while protecting the parent-child relationship 
and the stability for children that flows from it. 
Let me explain in more detail why I think that retaining recognition of parent-child relationships 
while abandoning the other features of ius sanguinis is sensible. At first glance, protecting the tying of 
children’s citizenship to that of their parents may appear problematic because of that relationship’s 
historical ties to property ownership. But a closer look shows that children really do deserve different 
legal treatment than adults, and ius filiationis is one critical way the law can recognise that difference.  
Ius sanguinis feels retrograde today because it developed during a time in which relationships 
between parents and children, as well as relationships between husbands and wives and masters and 
servants, were much more akin to property-chattel relationships than we understand them to be today. 
Today’s family law was yesterday’s law of the household, which set forth entitlements and obligations 
based on reciprocal legal statuses – parent and child, husband and wife, master and servant, master and 
apprentice (and sometimes master and slave). Each of these relationships was hierarchical, involving 
responsibilities on the part of the superior party in the hierarchy (father, husband, or master) and 
obligations of service on the part of the inferior party (child, wife, servant, apprentice, or slave).
1
 The 
inferior party derived identity from the superior: a wife or a child’s nominal citizenship often followed 
that of the husband or father, but this identity did not confer the same rights enjoyed by the superior 
party. In early America, for example, male citizens were often entitled to the right to vote, right to 
contract, and right to own property (in fact, ownership of property was often a prerequisite for voting) 
but their wives – also technically citizens – were not entitled to any of these rights. Their political 
participation took the form of providing moral guidance to their husbands and raising virtuous sons 
who could themselves exercise political power.
 2
 
Today, we no longer think of citizenship in this way. The rights conferred by citizenship are 
understood in Western democracies as universal. If, for example, I become a naturalised U.S. citizen, 
the same neutral voting laws apply to me that apply to any other citizen, regardless of my gender, 
marital status, race, or national origin. Likewise, laws that imposed derivative citizenship on wives, 
and even laws that expatriated women upon marriage – both of which used to be widespread – are no 
longer the norm. In many parts of the world, women are no longer understood as intellectually and 
financially dependent on their husbands but instead as autonomous adults, capable of making their 
own economic, moral, and legal decisions, including the decision to consent to citizenship or renounce 
it. And even more dramatically, we no longer think of servants as deriving legal identity from their 
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masters; instead, workers are free to participate in free, if regulated, labour markets and their 
citizenship status is independent of their employee status.
 3
  
The one legal distinction, however, that all countries still maintain in determining the capacity to 
exercise the rights associated with citizenship is age. Children are generally considered to be incapable 
of giving legal consent and in need of legal protection. The particular age at which they become 
capable of reasoning is contested, but it is incontestable that a newborn cannot care for himself nor 
meaningfully choose a nationality. In many circumstances, the law provides the protection children 
need by requiring children’s parents to provide for them, care of them, and make decisions for them; 
in some instances, the state takes on this responsibility (foster care and universal public education are 
both examples). Children occupy a very different legal space than women or workers, one that makes 
them vulnerable when their ties to their parents are weakened. Providing children with a citizenship 
that they can exercise simultaneously with that of at least one of their parents is a critical protection for 
their wellbeing. We can believe this to be so while simultaneously rejecting the traditional hierarchies 
of parent-child, husband-wife, and master-slave. The United Kingdom’s move away from 
conceptualizing parent-child relationships as ‘custodial’, property-like relationships and instead 
describing them as involving ‘parental responsibility’ is a good example of this shift. The emphasis 
has changed from ownership and control to care and protection. 
If, then, we still need a form of parent-to-child citizenship transmission, is ius sanguinis as 
traditionally understood what we need? Scholars, courts, and government agencies often take ius 
sanguinis literally, as the ‘rule of blood’. But I think that rigidity is misplaced. Even centuries ago the 
notion of ius sanguinis meant something distinct from a pure genetic tie. For men, who could never be 
certain of their child’s paternity, transmission ‘through blood’ often really meant transmission through 
choice. A man chose to acknowledge his children by marrying, or already being married to, their 
mother. Children born to unmarried mothers generally took on the citizenship of their mothers, not 
their fathers, regardless of whether the father was known. The notion of ‘blood’, then, was 
complicated by the requirement of marriage for citizenship transmission through the father and the 
man’s unique ability to embrace or repudiate his offspring based on his marital relationship to their 
mother. Presumably, many children, prior to blood and DNA testing, acquired citizenship iure 
sanguinis when there was actually no blood tie, sometimes in circumstances where the father was 
ignorant of this fact and sometimes where he knew full well no blood relationship existed.
4
 Ius 
sanguinis has always been about more and less than simply blood. 
Thus, Bauböck’s notion of ius filiationis seems to me both the most appropriate form today for 
citizenship transmission from parent to child to take, and a more accurate description of what really 
occurred historically. As I see it, the most challenging obstacle to implementing a ius filiationis system 
is that birthright citizenship is fixed in time. Courts are not in a position to predict on the date of a 
child’s birth the adult who will ultimately assume parental responsibility for a child, but they can 
determine who the genetic or marital parent is. Shifting to a ius filiationis system, then, requires a 
multifaceted response. First, statutes outlining the requirements for citizenship transmission at birth 
should be amended to identify the intended parents. In most circumstances, the intended parents will 
be the genetic parents, but in some instances they might be someone else – for example, a non-genetic 
parent who contracts with a gestational surrogate or the spouse or partner of a genetic parent. Various 
pieces of evidence, from birth certificates to contracts to court judgments, would be necessary to 
determine parentage. In cases involving ART, this solution would solve many of the current problems. 
A genetic tie would be but one piece of evidence in determining citizenship at birth. 
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In addition to reforming ius sanguinis statutes, however, I believe we must also broaden the other 
available pathways to citizenship outside of birthright citizenship and traditional forms of 
naturalisation. There could be a deadline – perhaps by a specified birthday – by when a functional 
parent could request a declaration of citizenship for the child he or she has parented since birth. This 
alternative means of citizenship transmission should not substitute for birthright citizenship; as Kristin 
Collins points out, making citizenship determinations using only functional tests would put children at 
the mercy of officials seeking to deny citizenship and could disadvantage genetic or intentional fathers 
who may be unable to demonstrate that their care has been substantial enough to be ‘functional But 
combined with a robust recognition of genetic and intentional parentage at birth, recognition of 
functional parentage later on could serve a supplemental purpose, ensuring that children will 
ultimately have access to citizenship rights in the country in which their functional parents reside. Full 
recognition of parent-child relationships requires going beyond the moment of birth so that we can 
recognise the individuals who actually take on parental responsibility. 
It is premature to forsake the recognition of parent-child relationships in citizenship law, not when 
citizenship is still the mechanism for ensuring that every human being has membership in at least one 
state and providing access to basic human rights. But it is time that we abandoned the idea that ‘blood’ 
is the sole basis of these relationships.  
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Law by blood or blood by law? 
David de Groot* 
I agree to certain extent with Costica Dumbrava that ius sanguinis encompasses certain problematic 
issues, especially where it concerns newer forms of procreation, like IVF for lesbian couples and 
surrogacy. However, the origin of the problem cannot be attributed to ius sanguinis, but to non-
solidarity of states that overuse the ordre public exemption for the denial of the recognition of 
parentage. But before delving into family relations and private international law conflicts, I would like 
to first argue that ius sanguinis is still the most suitable option for the main purposes of nationality law 
where it concerns children. 
The main purposes of nationality 
The commonly accepted main purposes of nationality are, first of all, that there is a territory to which 
an individual can always return and from which he cannot be deported, as was already pointed out by 
Bauböck and Titshaw; secondly, diplomatic and consular protection while being abroad; thirdly, 
national political participation in the state of nationality; and lastly, for EU citizens, free movement 
rights within the EU.  
An abandonment of ius sanguinis in favour of ius soli might lead to the situation described by 
Titshaw, where within the same family the children might have different nationalities, which could, 
for example, lead to the situation that they would have to move to different countries in case of their 
parents’ death while they are minor or that they might need to seek diplomatic protection from 
different foreign representations. Such a break-up of the family unit due to differing nationalities 
would certainly conflict with the right to family life. Therefore, for the purpose of preserving the unity 
and protection of the family, ius sanguinis is the most suitable option. If, when having attained 
majority the children feel that they have a closer bond with another nationality, they could still apply 
for naturalisation in that state.  
This bond of attachment brings me to the national political participation purpose of nationality 
which is connected to Dumbrava’s argument concerning the reproduction of the political community. 
Having the nationality of a certain state does not automatically mean integration into its society. This 
problem, depending on the mobility of the persons involved, does, however, not only occur with ius 
sanguinis and ius soli, but also with every other form of nationality transmission that one could think 
of. It should therefore be decided whom national political participation concerns most. If the definition 
of a ‘state’ refers primarily to a permanent population within its borders, long-term (non-national) 
residents should have national political participation rights and long-term absent nationals should not 
(except if they are working abroad in service of the state). National political participation rights should 
then be detached from nationality and therefore actually not be seen as a purpose of nationality (but 
that is a different discussion).  
It should however be noted that for purpose of inclusion of long-term resident families, who for 
some reason have not acquired the nationality by naturalisation, into the national population, a third 
generation ius soli or even a second generation ius soli, in cases where the first generation migrant has 
entered the country at a young age, would be appropriate. However, this should not come with an 
option requirement for dual nationals at reaching majority, as in Germany, in order to avoid a conflict 
of identity if one is forced to make a choice between the nationality acquired iure soli and another 
nationality acquired iure sanguinis.  
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Non-Solidarity of States 
The problems that arise when a state does not grant its nationality to a child due to non-recognition of 
parentage can only occur in cases where parentage has been established by another state in accordance 
with its national family law. In surrogacy cases this means a non-recognition of a foreign judgement or 
birth certificate and in cases of dual motherhood of married or registered lesbian couples a non-
recognition of the extended pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant principle. The pater est principle 
means that the husband of the woman that gives birth to the child is automatically considered to be the 
father and therefore directly at birth has a parentage link to the child. Increasingly, states have 
extended this principle to stable non-marital relationships and to same-sex marriages. 
If the child is born in the state of the discussed nationality the national family law (mostly) applies 
to the establishment of parentage. It would therefore not make any sense that parentage ties to a 
national could be established at birth by the state in question, without also granting the nationality (if 
ius sanguinis is applied). The problems that arise are thus nearly always recognition issues between 
states. 
There is a general principle of recognition of a civil status which was legally established abroad. 
Recognition can only be refused in cases of overriding reasons of ordre public. This ordre public 
principle should be limited by the best interest of the child and the right to family life. It can never be 
considered to be in the best interest of the child to have no parents at all instead of having parents with 
whom (s)he has no blood ties who want to care for her or him. This has also been stated by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy case. In that case an Italian 
couple had gotten a child through a surrogacy arrangement in Russia. When they brought the child to 
Italy the state refused to recognise the parentage ties, took the child away and placed him under 
guardianship. The Court stated that Italy had failed to take the best interest of the child sufficiently 
into consideration when weighting it against ordre public. It had especially failed to recognise the de 
facto family ties and imposed a measure reserved only for circumstances where the child is in danger. 
Another example where the best interest of the child should prevail is when the child from a second 
(polygamist) marriage is put in a worse position than a child born out of wedlock.  
The problem is thus a lack of solidarity between states that do not recognise family ties legally 
established in another state. The parentage for the purpose of acquisition of nationality should thus be 
based on family law, including a more lenient approach in the private international law rules to 
recognition of a civil status acquired abroad.  
I therefore like Bauböck’s proposal of a ius filiationis. I see it, however, more as a change from 
‘law by blood’, meaning parentage ties based on blood relationship, to a ‘blood by law’ relationship, 
meaning that parentage ties are seen to be established by the law. This thus means only an extension of 
the ‘blood’ definition. Bauböck’s fear that this could create a situation where the child could not 
acquire a nationality at birth, due to the complex determination of parenthood, could technically be 
avoided by a pre-birth determination of parentage.  
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Limiting the transmission of family advantage: ius sanguinis with an expiration date 
Iseult Honohan* 
Costica Dumbrava has done a great service in stimulating us to reconsider the justification of ius 
sanguinis and to disaggregate its different forms. 
I am sympathetic to critiques of ius sanguinis as a dominant mode of citizenship acquisition. Yet I 
acknowledge that the significance of family life for parents and children seems to offer some grounds 
for ius sanguinis citizenship – at least in a world of migration controls where citizenship is the only 
firm guarantee of right of entry to a country. I will argue here that to limit the extension of inherited 
privilege in this domain, however, this form of citizenship should be awarded provisionally.  
Others here have shown convincingly that there is nothing inherently ethnically exclusive about ius 
sanguinis. Furthermore, it does not have to be understood in terms of bare genetic descent; so sorting 
out the deficiencies of current ius sanguinis provision does not depend on resolving all the issues of 
biological parenthood raised by the new reproductive technologies. If ius sanguinis can be detached 
from the strict genetic interpretation, it no longer provides a warrant for indefinite transmission across 
successive generations on the basis of biological descent. Thus two of the sharpest criticisms of ius 
sanguinis seem to have been defused.  
It remains to consider in what way ius sanguinis might be necessary. On the one hand, various 
forms of ius soli can be seen as giving continuity of membership for the state and security for children 
born in the country. For those born in the country of their parents’ citizenship there is little material 
difference between ius soli and ius sanguinis. But ius sanguinis citizenship may be seen as necessary 
when a child is born to parents living outside the state of their citizenship. Even if the child gains ius 
soli citizenship in the country in which she is born, this does not guarantee the security of the family. 
Focusing on what have been termed ‘social parenthood’, or functional parenting relationships of care, 
rather than simply biological descent, others here (Bauböck, Owen and Collins) have pointed to the 
way in which common citizenship best secures family life in allowing parents and children to stay 
together or move back to the country of their parent’s citizenship.  
What I want to address here is the further question: what forms or extent of ius sanguinis 
citizenship are warranted on the basis of this account?  
Protecting families but not privilege 
We may start from the consideration that those in the position of parents have an interest in and a 
particular responsibility to care for their children when young, implying a clear and fundamental 
interest in living together and being able to move together. These can be seen as necessary conditions 
for realising many of the intrinsic and non-substitutable goods of family life, or what have been called 
‘familial relationship goods’, which include child-rearing and asymmetric intimacy.1 These involve 
agent-specific obligations that can be realised only within family relationships of care and throughout 
childhood.
2
 Thus this fundamental interest should be protected. Brighouse and Swift emphasise 
however, that we should not, in protecting these intrinsic goods, fail to distinguish them from other 
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advantages external to familial relationship goods that parents can confer on their children, such as 
private education or concentrated wealth, which do not warrant protection.
 3
 
Can ius sanguinis citizenship, even if not based solely on genetic descent, support such 
unwarranted transmission of privilege? Citizenship grants more than the opportunity to live with and 
be cared for by your parents when you are a child. It provides membership of a political community 
and the benefits at least of entry and residence in that state, the right to participate in national elections 
and sometimes access to other rights. Under a regime of ius sanguinis, even understood as grounded in 
the rights of parents and children to share citizenship, the transmission of citizenship to children born 
to citizens abroad can mean that people with no connection to the country retain the benefits of 
citizenship, and, at the very least, can lead to a mismatch between the citizen body and the community 
of those who live in, and are particularly subject to, the state. Thus, life-long citizenship in the absence 
of real connections could well be seen as falling into the category of advantages that parents should 
not necessarily be able to convey to their children.  
This is not to suggest that ius sanguinis citizenship is just a form of property or unearned privilege.
4
 
But there are still concerns about how to secure the legitimate interests of parents to care for their 
children, and of children to be protected, without justifying the transmission of privilege. My focus 
here is on considering how to guarantee the security of children to live and move with their parents 
through shared citizenship without supporting the unwarranted extension of privilege in the domain of 
citizenship.  
This suggests the following limited justification for birthright ius sanguinis citizenship - rather than 
the universal child status and deferred, or provisional, ius soli citizenship that Dumbrava recommends.  
Provisional ius sanguinis  
First, birthright citizenship per se is justified because people need the protection of citizenship from 
birth.
5
 Note that this is not mainly because they are children and thus innocent or particularly 
vulnerable (pace Harder), nor despite the fact that they are children and thus (arguably) not capable of 
consenting or participating politically, but while they are children, and like others, are both subject to 
the power of a state and in need of protection by a state. Dumbrava’s proposal that children might gain 
a universal status of childhood and that citizenship should depend on their being able to choose, have 
established a connection, and developed capacities and virtues of citizenship overlooks the centrality 
of the legal status of citizenship to security, and the fact that this security should not be conditional on 
the qualities or practices of citizens. 
The specific justification of ius sanguinis citizenship then derives from the way in which common 
citizenship between parents and children is the most secure way of guaranteeing their ability to live 
and move together. This can be in addition to the citizenship the child may acquire by ius soli; dual 
citizenship of the state of birth and that of parents’ is not in itself problematic if a person has 
connections in both countries. 
Because children need citizenship from birth, there is an argument for birthright citizenship; 
because young children need to be able to live with (and be cared for by) their parents, there is an 
argument for ius sanguinis citizenship at the time where this is most needed. Both of these concerns 
support an award of citizenship that is not deferred, but that is also not always retained indefinitely. 
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It may be objected that the withdrawal of citizenship should not be lightly recommended. Indeed 
this is true. But the strongest ground for withdrawal is the absence of any genuine link between a 
person and the state of citizenship. Thus, writing on birthright citizenship, Vink and De Groot offer a 
similar suggestion:
6
 ‘an alternative to limiting the transmission of citizenship at birth is the provision 
for the loss of citizenship if a citizen habitually resides abroad and no longer has a sufficient genuine 
link with the state involved’.7 Indeed they go on to say that ‘[f]rom our perspective, a provision on the 
loss of citizenship due to the lack of a sufficient link is to be preferred to limiting the transmission of 
citizenship in case of birth abroad’, on the grounds that this gives the child herself the opportunity to 
decide whether to establish that link, which thus should remain available until after majority, at the 
point when the child is better placed to make an independent decision.
8
  
Thus, the parsimonious account of ius sanguinis defended here suggests that it should be awarded 
only provisionally – held through childhood, but requiring the establishment of connections of certain 
kinds, most clearly by a period of residence in the country of that citizenship by, or soon after, 
majority.
9
 Confirmation would not depend on abjuring any other citizenship, as the aim would not be 
to avoid or reduce dual citizenship, but rather to reduce the numbers of citizens whose connections to a 
country are minimal or non-existent.  
Such a conditional citizenship could take seriously the justifiable claims of families without leading 
to the unwarranted extension of family advantage. 
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Retain ius sanguinis, but don’t take it literally! 
Eva Ersbøll* 
There is no doubt that Costica Dumbrava has raised an important question about whether to abandon 
ius sanguinis citizenship. His arguments are that ius sanguinis is historically tainted and unfit to deal 
with contemporary issues such as developments in reproductive technologies and changes in family 
practices and norms; he also claims that ius sanguinis is normatively unnecessary, as it is possible to 
deliver its advantages by other means. 
In my opinion, it is not time to abandon ius sanguinis, mainly because it is impossible to secure its 
advantages by other means. Admittedly, ius sanguinis, if taken literally, is unfit to deal with 
contemporary issues such as complex family arrangements involving, among other things, assisted 
reproduction technologies (ART). However, it seems possible to solve many problems by applying a 
modified principle of ius sanguinis translated into ius filiationis, as suggested by Rainer Bauböck and 
supported by most of the participants in this debate.  
What matters is, as also expressed by many authors, that children from a human rights perspective 
need their parents’ citizenship - or rather, the citizenship of their primary caretakers, be they biological 
parents or not.  
A solution to many of the problems related to reproductive technologies has been advanced by the 
Council of Europe, the Committee of Ministers, in Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)13 on the 
nationality of children:  
Member states should apply to children their provisions on acquisition of nationality by right of 
blood if, as a result of a birth conceived through medically assisted reproductive techniques, a 
child-parent family relationship is established or recognised by law.
1
  
Still, it is of course necessary to examine more closely the arguments against ius sanguinis and the 
practical solutions to its shortcomings. 
History is not an argument  
As Jannis Panagiotidis writes, history cannot justify abandoning ius sanguinis. The use of the principle 
may have been problematic in the past, and still, it may be all right today. Besides, as argued by 
Rainer Bauböck and others, it is possible to overcome ethno-nationalist dispositions by modifying a 
ius sanguinis principle, supplemented with ius soli and residence-based modes of acquisition.  
As things stand, ius sanguinis citizenship is in my opinion irreplaceable. It provides, in accordance 
with the Convention on the Rights of the Child (article 7) for automatic acquisition of citizenship by 
birth. In addition, it seems to be one of the most simple and secure acquisition modes when it comes to 
protection against statelessness, as it has the ability to protect children against statelessness from the 
very beginning of their life.  
What is more, it is a central international law principle. For instance, state parties to the European 
Convention on Nationality are obliged to grant citizenship automatically at birth to children of (one of) 
their citizens (if born on their territory, cf. article 6(1)). 
To me, it seems risky to jettison such an effective principle anchored in binding human rights 
standards. 
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Unity of the family 
Ius sanguinis is not the only relevant principle. Others, like the unity of the family, safeguard the same 
interests and may be applied in a broader perspective. To mention a few situations, take acquisition by 
adoption and acquisition by filial transfer based on the fact that the target person is a natural, adopted 
or foster child of a citizen.  
In addition, new automatic modes of acquisition by birth are developing. Denmark, for instance, 
has amended its law in 2014 to provide for automatic acquisition of citizenship by birth by children 
with ‘a Danish father, mother or co-mother’. 2 This is an example of citizenship acquisition based on 
ius filiationis as advanced by Rainer Bauböck. 
As Costica Dumbrava rightly anticipated, a reasonable reservation in this debate has been that the 
main problems connected with the development of ART do not lie with ius sanguinis citizenship but 
with the determination of legal parentage. Such determination may take long time and involve a 
number of legal uncertainties and ethical dilemmas. Still, as argued by among others Rainer Bauböck 
and Scott Titshaw, states have in any case to fix their family law and figure out how to determine legal 
parenthood. Subsequently, children’s right to their legal parents’ citizenship may not raise major 
problems. 
Ius filiationis benefits 
Developing a ius filiationis principle may entail even more advantages. Among others, it may solve 
some of the problems originating from loss or so-called quasi-loss of citizenship following the 
disappearance of a family relationship.
3
 Disappearance or annulment of a family relationship may 
have consequences for a person’s citizenship based on that family relationship. Many states assume 
that if a person has acquired his or her citizenship through a child-parent family relationship that 
citizenship will be lost or even nullified if the family relationship disappears.
4
 If, however, states 
recognise citizenship based on social rather than biological parenthood, the threat of loss or quasi-loss 
may not arise in the case of disappearance of a biological family relationship.  
Human rights protection at this stage 
According to the Council of Europe recommendations on the nationality of the child, quoted in the 
introduction, member states should apply the ius sanguinis principle in ART-cases where the child-
parent family relationship is established or recognised by law. The crucial question is of course under 
which conditions the intended parents’ country must recognise such a family relationship if it has been 
legally established abroad. 
David de Groot points out that states can only refuse recognition in case of overriding reasons of 
ordre public, and he criticises states’ overuse of the ordre public exemption for the denial of 
parentage. As he rightly argues, it cannot be in the best interest of the child to have no parents at all, 
instead of caring parents without blood ties. David de Groot refers to the 2015 judgment of European 
                                                     
2 Costica Dumbrava gives an inadequate Danish example regarding the acquisition possibilities for children born out of 
wedlock. For long, such children have been entitled to naturalise regardless of residence in Denmark, although until 
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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy.
5
 Here, the Court ruled that the 
removal of a child born to a surrogate mother and his placement in care amounted to a violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights article 8 on respect for private and family life. 
In 2014, the ECtHR dealt with another case concerning the effects of non-recognition of a legal 
parent-child relationship between children conceived through assisted reproduction, Mennesson v. 
France.
6
 A French married couple had decided to undergo in vitro fertilisation using the gametes of 
the husband and an egg from a donor with the intention to enter into a gestational surrogacy agreement 
with a Californian woman. The surrogacy mother gave birth to twins, and the Californian Supreme 
Court ruled that the French father was their genetic father and the French mother their legal mother. 
France, however, refused on grounds of ordre public to recognise the legal parent-child relationship 
that was lawfully established in California as a result of the surrogacy agreement. 
The ECtHR ruled that the children’s right to respect for their private life – which implies that they 
must be able to establish the substance of their identity – was substantially affected by the non-
recognition of the legal parent-child relationship between the children and the intended parents. 
Having regard to the consequence of the serious restriction on their identity and right to respect for 
their family life, the Court found that France had overstepped the permissible limits of its margin of 
appreciation by preventing both recognition and establishment under domestic law of the children’s 
relationship with their biological father. Considering the importance of having regard to the child’s 
best interest, the Court concluded that the children’s right to respect for their private life had been 
infringed. 
The Court also dealt with the children’s access to citizenship as an element of their identity (see 
also Genovese v Malta).
7
 Although the children’s biological father was French, they faced a worrying 
uncertainty as to their possibilities to be recognised as French citizens. According to the Court, that 
uncertainty was liable to have negative repercussions on their definition of their personal identity. 
In Mennesson, the ECtHR’s analysis took on the special dimension where one of the parents was 
the children’s biological parent; it is, however, in my opinion difficult to imagine that the Court should 
reach a different conclusion in a similar case where both gametes and egg were from a donor. 
Paradiso and Campanelli may underpin this position that also appears to be supported by the fact that 
the Court has explicitly recognised that respect for the child’s best interest must guide any decision in 
cases involving children’s right to respect for their private life. In this context the Court has made it 
clear that respect for children’s private life implies that they must be able to establish the substance of 
their identity, including the legal parent-child relationship.  
Other ways to protect parent-child relationship 
Costica Dumbrava argues that there are other and better ways to protect the parent-child relationship 
than through the same citizenship status, for instance by conferring full migration rights to children of 
citizens or establishing a universal status of legal childhood that protects children regardless of their or 
their parents’ status. 
                                                     
5 Case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, judgment of 27 January 2015 
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I find it hard to believe that any of these means can afford children a similarly effective protection 
of their right to a family life with their parents in their country. 
Children need their parents’ citizenship  ¸ as pointed out by Rainer Bauböck and many others, 
because citizenship is a part of a person’s identity. Where and to whom one is born are facts that feed 
into developing a sense of belonging. Moreover, the unity of the family in relation to citizenship 
secures that children can stay with their parents in their country.  
The course of events that followed the independence of women in citizenship matters seems 
illustrative. In Denmark for instance, when married women gained independence in citizenship matters 
in 1950, it was a major concern that in mixed marriages, where the spouses had different citizenship, 
the woman might lose her unconditional right to stay in her husband’s country. The legislator assumed 
that the aliens’ law would be administered in such a way that a wife would not be separated from her 
husband unless a pressing social need necessitated the separation.
 8
 Things have, however, developed 
differently. Nowadays, foreigners married to Danish citizens are subject to the same requirements for 
family reunification as foreign couples. Thus, a foreign spouse may be expelled if for instance her 
Danish husband has received cash benefits within the last three years before a residence permit could 
be granted; notably, this may apply regardless of whether the couple has a child with Danish 
citizenship. 
A need for international guidelines on legal recognition of parenthood 
As already mentioned, there is no doubt that Costica Dumbrava has raised an important discussion 
about continuous application of ius sanguinis citizenship. While there seems to be little support for 
abandoning the ius sanguinis principle, there seems to be almost unanimous support for modifying and 
modernising it. As recommended by the Council of Europe, states should apply to children conceived 
through medically assisted reproductive techniques their provisions on ius sanguinis acquisition of 
citizenship.  
The problem remains that states must establish or recognise the child-parent family relationship by 
law, and often, two states with different approaches are involved in the recognition procedure. 
Therefore, ordre public considerations may arise as demonstrated in many of the concrete cases 
mentioned in this Citizenship Forum. In order to achieve consensus about the recognition of a parent-
child family relationship in the best interest of the child, states should engage in international 
cooperation with a view to adopting common guidelines – as they have done in adoption matters. 
 
                                                     
8 See the Danish citizenship report at  
 http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/36504/EUDO_CIT_CR_2015_14_Denmark.pdf?sequence=1  
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Distributing Some, but Not All, Rights of Citizenship According to Ius Sanguinis 
Ana Tanasoca* 
In an article published in 1987 Joseph Carens famously remarked that ‘[c]itizenship in Western liberal 
democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege – an inherited status that greatly enhances 
one’s life chances. Like feudal birthright privileges, restrictive citizenship is hard to justify when one 
thinks about it closely’.1 Some 30 years after, he himself offers a justification of birthright citizenship, 
a change of heart and mind that he partly explains by the following: ‘I thought that my open borders 
arguments was getting at an important truth. At the same time, I recognized that it was not a practical 
proposal and that it did not provide much guidance for actual policy issues…’; ‘In thinking about what 
to do in a particular situation, we have to consider questions of priority and questions of political 
feasibility, among other factors. One cannot move always from principles to a plan of action’. 2 Yet 
succumbing too much to such feasibility constraints, to use a popular term in the field, is dangerous. 
Moral (political) theorizing should not be too tightly hemmed in by empirical facts. Rather it should be 
the other way around, insofar as our moral and political theory aims to tell us what existing empirical 
facts we should strive to change or overcome. 
That is why Costica Dumbrava’s critique of the ius sanguinis principle of citizenship ascription is, 
in a way, a much-needed intervention.
3
 While I overall agree with Dumbrava’s argument that ius 
sanguinis is unable to cope with the diversification of family structures and not that morally appealing 
to begin with, I disagree with him on the details. I disagree especially with his background assumption 
that family ties (although not exclusively genetic, as it is presently the case) must play a salient role in 
the distribution of citizenship – although in the second part of this contribution I do offer a potential 
defence of his view against what is probably the strongest objection to his argument, which is that the 
abolishment of ius sanguinis would split families apart. 
The main question is: Why should we insist on ius sanguinis except because it would ensure that 
nobody is stateless, that is, that everyone’s human right to citizenship is satisfied? And insofar as 
statelessness can be equally avoided via ius soli, why should blood ties create an entitlement to 
citizenship? 
The problem of making citizenship dependent on family ties 
Dumbrava notices that ius sanguinis is unable to cope with the increased diversification of family 
structures made possible by the assisted reproduction technologies (ART). Yet there are solutions to 
that problem.  
One would be, as Scott Titshaw notices, to reform family laws as to recognise diverse forms of 
parentage. Another one would be to replace ius sanguinis with ius filiationis, as Rainer Bauböck 
proposes. If the purpose of upholding ius sanguinis citizenship is to recognise and protect the family, 
we should replace it with more reliable indicator(s) of parenthood in the case where parenthood is no 
longer uniquely a matter of biology. As Kerry Abrams argues, the recognition of parenthood now 
requires ‘going beyond the moment of birth’. 
Notice, however, were multiple indicators of parenthood to be accepted, those individuals born via 
ART might be entitled to multiple citizenships. They might, for example, be entitled to the citizenship 
                                                     
* University of Canberra. 
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of the egg donor or the sperm donor or the surrogate mother, as well as to the citizenship of those who 
intend to raise the child. Such a situation may be deemed problematic in various respects: first because 
it would create great inequalities; second, because it would end up trivializing citizenship if all types 
of parenthood (e.g., the relationships the surrogate mother, the egg donor or the sperm donor, and the 
intended parents have with the child) would be treated as equally morally relevant and therefore 
worthy of state recognition.  
Dumbrava also bemoans ius sanguinis as failing to capture the political function of citizenship. If 
we grant citizenship to the children of citizens because we expect such children to develop the 
attitudes and skills required for political participation in their parents’ state, why not wait to confer 
citizenship until these attitudes and skill are actually confirmed? And what would happen if they never 
develop these skills and attitudes? Should people be deprived of their birthright citizenship altogether, 
or perhaps only of their political rights? Besides, while we might have a clear idea of what skills (e.g., 
reading and writing to enable voting) citizenship requires, what can we say of the attitudes citizens 
should display? Should apathetic voters be stripped of their political rights for failing to display the 
right attitude towards their right to vote? According to Dumbrava’s reasoning, perhaps we should. 
But the main problem both with Dumbrava’s critique and the other contributors’ accounts is that 
they conceive of citizenship as primarily reflecting a bond (genetic or affective or intentional) between 
two individuals—the parent and the child – and not as a bond between an individual and a state, or an 
individual and a community. As such, it overlooks the political nature and function of citizenship. It is 
also likely to leave us with a very limited, rigid, and exclusionary conception of the demos, one that is 
at the same time unjust and inefficient. As Rainer Bauböck put it elsewhere, ‘[n]ormative principles 
for membership must instead lead to boundaries that avoid both under- und over- inclusiveness’,4 
particularly in the context of increased global mobility. 
In his contribution to this forum, however, Bauböck argues that birthright citizenship creates a 
‘quasi-natural equality of status’ among those entitled to it. He represents it as avoiding divisions, by 
making citizenship part of people’s unchosen and permanent personal features, namely, where and to 
whom one is born.
5
 Yet as such it creates exclusion and inequality between those entitled and those 
unentitled that can be hard to justify or overcome, as Lois Harder rightly notices. Why should the son 
of a citizen of state A be entitled to citizenship in that state, but not a regular immigrant residing for 
years in state A, paying taxes there and having virtually all of his interests deeply affected by the 
institutions of state A? While the first has unconditional and automatic access to citizenship – a right 
to citizenship in virtue of his blood ties to another citizen – the second has to apply for naturalisation, 
which is subject to the state’s discretionary powers. That is, his residence in that state, contributions to 
the community or his interests being affected by that state’s institutions, do not automatically ground 
any right to citizenship for him in the same way blood ties do for the citizens’ progeny. 
Why should the boundaries of the demos be defined by family ties, rather than social or political 
kinship? By ascribing citizenship on the basis of blood ties we conceive of political communities as 
big extended families rather than communities gathered around common interests, values, and goals. 
Such a conception of the demos is disrespectful of individual consent (no one consents to being born, 
to having these parents rather than others or to the colour of their passport). It attaches too much value 
to contingencies and too little value to individual choices. A political community based on ancestry is, 
after all, just an overinflated dynasty.  
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Limiting the scope of ius sanguinis 
While abolishing ius sanguinis might be a good idea, we could nonetheless be worried that the 
transition costs would outweigh potential benefits. After all, most families today are still founded on 
blood ties. Abolishing ius sanguinis altogether could create situations where parents and children are 
not citizens of the same state. Such policy, it is argued by several contributors, would have the 
disruptive effect of potentially separating families, preventing parents from discharging their parental 
duties and leaving children deprived of the care they are entitled to. (Of course, nothing prevents 
parents from applying for a visa or for citizenship if they wish to reside or share a citizenship with 
their progeny; but let us assume that the parents do not have the means to do that, or that even doing 
that would not guarantee that they can be reunited with their child immediately as we would wish.) 
This is, I think, the strongest argument against Dumbrava’s proposal.  
One solution would be, of course, to replace ius sanguinis with another principle for citizenship 
allocation, perhaps affected interests or perhaps ius domicilii. As children’s and parents’ interests are 
interdependent, the affected interests principle would ensure that children and parents are members of 
the same state. So would ius domicilii, at least in cases where parents and children are currently 
domiciled in the same state (although it would provide no citizenship-based grounds for family 
reunion, in cases where they are not). 
My proposal, however, takes a different tack. Notice that in a world with genuinely open borders 
we need not be worried that parents and children would be separated if they are citizens of different 
states. The solution I propose would therefore be to limit the scope of ius sanguinis – that is distribute 
some, but not all rights traditionally associated with citizenship, on the basis of ius sanguinis. This 
would be an appealing compromise, insofar as some of us may think citizenship should not be 
distributed on the basis of blood ties, while nonetheless accepting that blood ties are one (albeit not the 
only) relevant ground for the distribution of some categories of rights.  
As Bauböck notices in his contribution, immigrant minors who are EU citizens have a ‘right to 
stay’ that protects their primary caregivers from deportation. Yet, most likely, this policy is a 
recognition of an entitlement to care that the child has – not a recognition of a right the parents have to 
stay strictly in virtue of their blood ties to the child. Blood ties may simply serve as the operational 
indicator of the primary caregivers.  
My preferred solution, however, would entitle a person to the limited enjoyment of some rights in a 
state, on the basis of having blood ties to someone who is already a citizen of that state. I primarily 
have in view, among that limited subset of rights, the right to enter and leave the state and the right of 
residence. By ‘limited’ I also mean that the enjoyment of these rights, purely on the basis of ius 
sanguinis, should be time-constrained.
 6
  
Take the case of minors having a different citizenship from their parents. My proposal would be: 
either the parents should be granted extensive residence rights, until the minor reaches adulthood as in 
the case above; or else the minor should be granted these rights, provided the parents wish to remain in 
their country of citizenship. Consider the case of a couple, both citizens of state A, who move to state 
B and give birth there to a child, who becomes via ius soli citizen of B. Under my proposal, the 
parents would be automatically entitled to residence in state B until the child is 18, provided the family 
decides to reside in state B; equally, the child would be automatically entitled to reside in state A until 
18 if the family decides to reside there.  
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Things would be different in the case of adults. Say my mother and I are citizens of different 
countries, she of state A and I of state B. Under my proposal, I as an adult would not be entitled to all 
the current rights of citizenship in state A on the basis of ius sanguinis. Still, I may nonetheless be 
automatically entitled on the same ground to a right to freely enter state A and reside there for a 
limited period of time (for example, 1 month). That would allow me to visit and spend time with my 
mother, preserving my family ties intact and allowing me to discharge whatever ordinary duties I have 
towards family members. But what if my mother becomes frail or ill, and I become her caregiver and 
need to spend more than one month in state A? If the circumstances require it, I should be able to 
petition for my right to remain to be extended, and that petition should be automatically granted so 
long as authorities are satisfied that the requisite circumstances really do prevail. The period for which 
one can enjoy such rights, and the categories of rights one enjoys, might be extendable in this way. 
Alternatively, of course, I could bring my mother to reside with me in state B on a (elderly) dependent 
visa.  
Under my proposal, there would thus be a limit to what one is entitled to under ius sanguinis alone. 
We should not think of the distribution of citizenship rights as an all-or-nothing affair. Among the 
many component rights currently associated with citizenship, different rights can and should be 
distributed separately according to different criteria. By the same token, many different criteria can 
serve as a legitimate ground for the distribution of any one of those constituent rights.  
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Learning from naturalisation debates: the right to an appropriate citizenship at birth 
Katja Swider* and Caia Vlieks 
Citizenship has a political and a legal dimension. In his opening contribution, Costica Dumbrava only 
marginally addresses the legal dimension of citizenship, acknowledging its importance, but suggesting 
that it is replaceable with alternative arrangements, such as a universal status for children. Maybe he is 
right in his priorities; maybe citizenship status should primarily be reserved for the purpose of 
fostering a political community. But in reality much legal baggage is attached to citizenship, and one 
cannot simply shake it off, even if this appears normatively attractive. In a way, the whole human 
rights movement can be seen as an effort to separate access to legal rights from possessing a status of 
political membership, and this attempt has not reached its goal (yet). As Jannis Panagiotidis points out, 
‘most so-called human rights are in fact citizens’ rights’. Citizenship is still the ‘right to have rights’. 
Avoidance of statelessness is therefore not just a legal whim; it is a human rights failsafe mechanism.  
In our contribution we start from the assumption that leaving anyone, including (and especially) 
children, without a citizenship for any significant period of time is not an option due to the essential 
legal rights that are attached to the status of national citizenship. The question therefore is not whether 
children should acquire a citizenship at birth, but which citizenship they should acquire at birth. 
Should it be the citizenship of their parents? And if not, what alternatives to birthright citizenship 
arrangements are adequate?  
While we consider attribution of citizenship at birth to be necessary, we also maintain that it is 
inherently unfair, regardless of what mechanisms of attribution are relied upon. There is nothing fair 
about attaching the fate of a child to one state, when states differ so tremendously in their ability (and 
willingness) to provide access to basic rights, such as education, healthcare, physical safety and 
pursuit of happiness for their minor citizens. Rainer Bauböck shifts attention from this unfairness by 
suggesting that ‘we have to address the causes of global inequality directly’ instead of criticising the 
contingencies of birthright citizenship. However, we should not forget that this discussion takes place 
largely among the privileged ‘winners’ of the ‘birthright lottery’.1 There is no doubt that global 
inequalities need to be addressed, but is it morally justifiable to suggest to the ‘losers’ of the birthright 
lottery to wait for global equality?  
If fairness in birthright citizenship cannot be achieved and leaving children without any citizenship 
is unacceptable, what is the normative ideal that we could strive towards in attributing citizenship at 
birth? As Lois Harder correctly argues here, rules about birthright attribution of citizenship are as 
politically charged as rules about acquiring and losing a nationality during adulthood, even though the 
former are not as much part of the public debate. According to Harder, ‘[t]he magical power of 
birthright citizenship is that it makes it possible for us to know and rehearse [politically charged] rules 
while simultaneously making birthright seem straightforward, static and apolitical’. Can we reverse 
this logic, and perhaps also learn from the extensively politicised discourse on migrants’ rights to 
naturalisation in order to improve birthright citizenship rules?  
In particular, we suggest applying the concept of appropriate citizenship to strengthen the 
normative foundation of birthright citizenship attribution. This notion is based on the ideas of Ernst 
Hirsch Ballin, who advocates ‘a citizenship that is appropriate to everyone’s life situation, where he or 
she is at home – which can change during the course of a person’s life: a natural right to be recognized 
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as a citizen, born free’. 2 He believes that this type of citizenship and citizens' rights can overcome the 
existing gap between ‘the universality of human rights’ and ‘the changing political and social settings 
of people’s lives’. 3 Drawing on that, we feel that appropriate citizenship, even when acquired at birth, 
could do the same. Appropriate citizenship is of course a highly subjective concept, the interpretation 
of which would be dependent on numerous cultural and specific national legal factors. Ensuring that 
birthright citizenship is appropriate would imply a case-by-case evaluation of the individual situation 
of each newborn, a process which in most cases would be as simple as the registration of birth, but in 
some cases would require a complex investigation to be conducted in a very brief period of time.  
While perhaps logistically counter-intuitive, introducing the normative standard of appropriateness 
into the attribution of citizenship at birth is not more complex than trying to solve ad hoc ‘hard cases’ 
of citizenship within the traditional logic of ius sanguinis versus ius soli. This complexity of some 
birthright citizenship cases has been extensively discussed in the contributions by Dumbrava and Scott 
Titshaw. Requiring that birthright citizenship is appropriate emphasises the importance of 
(meaningful) ties
4
 of a person (including a child) to a country, and thus incorporates the idea of ius 
nexi discussed by David Owen. With the criterion of appropriateness we accept that birthright 
citizenship is a political issue, not a contingent biological fact of life, and therefore should be based in 
a reasoned decision-making process and subjected to normative criticism.  
The requirement that citizenship acquired at birth needs to be appropriate is far from being precise. 
However, we believe that a certain amount of flexibility is necessary in order to ensure that attribution 
of citizenship at birth has a normative foundation in each individual case. The exact modes of 
implementation of the criterion of appropriateness would need to be developed within the individual 
legal systems, but important factors to be considered include the ones that have been discussed 
elaborately in this forum discussion:  
 the nationalities of the persons that are expected to care for the child (biological, social or 
functional parents or otherwise, thus including and reinforcing the ius filiationis proposal put 
forward by Bauböck); 
 the country where the child is born; 
 the country where the child is expected to build his or her future, receive education and 
effectuate his or her rights as a citizen; 
 the necessity of ensuring that at least one nationality is acquired and that the best interests of the 
child are safeguarded (in line with the almost universally ratified Convention on the Rights of 
the Child).
5
 
It is not always easy to determine all the relevant criteria for establishing appropriateness of 
citizenship with a high degree of certainty. Kerry Abrams, for example, identifies some possible 
obstacles when discussing Bauböck’s ius filiationis proposal, namely that courts sometimes cannot 
determine who will ultimately be the parent that is truly (legally) responsible for the child. However, 
since the proposal of appropriate nationality is based on multiple relevant factors rather than a single 
one, the risks associated with the inability to assess some of the factors are ameliorated by the 
availability of other factors that can compensate for uncertainties. 
Finally, we would like to emphasize that Hirsch Ballin’s ideas and the concept of appropriate 
nationality that we have introduced are compatible with having multiple nationalities, as well as 
changing one’s nationality over the course of one’s life. It is appropriate to enable children, as well as 
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adults, to acquire a new nationality to reflect the changes in their personal circumstances. When 
attributing an appropriate nationality at birth to a child, states therefore do not need to embark on the 
impossible task of predicting the future. 
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Don’t put the baby in the dirty bathwater! A Rejoinder 
Costica Dumbrava* 
This has been a fascinating debate that succeeded in unravelling some of the major issues about the 
past, present and future of ius sanguinis citizenship. I was delighted to see that many of the 
contributors shared my concerns about the failings of the current system of transmission of citizenship 
from parent to child. I learned a great deal from reading the various reactions to my deliberately 
provocative propositions. With these concluding remarks, I use the privilege of the last word to engage 
with several key points emerging from the debate and to clarify and, as much as possible, elaborate my 
position. However, I am hopeful that this debate does not finish here and I look forward to continuing 
through other ventures. 
How ethnic is ius sanguinis and why does it matter? 
I think we are in agreement that ius sanguinis is not inherently ethnic and that it can take on ethnic 
connotations depending on particular historical and policy contexts. The apple of discord is whether 
the gravity of such occurrences recommends the abolishment of ius sanguinis. I concede that empirical 
evidence is not conclusive for dismissing the principle of ius sanguinis. However, I caution that we 
should not underestimate the dangers of ethnonationalist instrumental uses of ius sanguinis.  
Panagiotidis explains clearly the difference between legal descent (descent from a citizen) and 
ethnic descent (descent from a non-citizen of a particular ethnicity) and shows that the objection about 
the ethnic character of ius sanguinis is founded on a big conceptual confusion. While I agree that ius 
sanguinis is conceptually distinct from ethnic or racial descent, I would hesitate to say that the two 
have ‘nothing to do’ with one another. Unfortunately, it is not only distracted scholars that make this 
confusion. The ambiguity between legal and ethnic descent is often present in legal practices and 
political discourses about birthright citizenship. In my initial contribution I mentioned co-ethnic 
citizenship because these policies frequently rely on the ambivalence between legal and ethnic 
descent. For example, legal criteria of descent from citizens (or from former citizens or from former 
citizens of a former part of a country, etc.) are often used as a smoke screen for selecting future 
citizens according to (perceived) ethnic descent. It matters less that these policies rarely achieve the 
goal of ethnic selectivity as long as the very statement of the commitment to include co-ethnics is 
likely to bring significant political and ideological gains. As Decimo and Harder argue, despite being a 
technical and legalistic principle, ius sanguinis carries significant ideological connotations, among 
which the myth of commonality of blood or ethnic descent is often prevalent.  
I also doubt that the ethnonationalist uses of ius sanguinis are only a matter of the past and I am not 
convinced that they are unlikely to be ‘used like that in the future’ (Panagiotidis). What else if not the 
fear of ethno-national extinction drove Latvia and Estonia in 1990 to reinstate their pre-war citizenship 
laws and to apply ius sanguinis retrospectively back to pre-1940 citizens? It is besides the point that 
not all newly recognised citizens were ethnic Latvians or Estonians (as not all of the pre-war citizens 
were). The political-nationalist gains obtained from the perception that the overwhelming majority of 
them were co-ethnics and from the symbolic reinstatement of the original national citizenry were 
significant. The same can be said about the Romanian policy to restore citizenship to all those who lost 
Romanian citizenship independently of their will. In this case, ius sanguinis has been used to trace 
descendants of citizens several generations back in view of recovering the ‘national stock’ lost with 
the territorial changes during WWII. 
                                                     
* Maastricht University. 
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It is true, as Bauböck and Collins rightly point out, that both ius sanguinis and ius soli (and 
combinations thereof) can have either emancipatory or exclusionary implications, depending on the 
context. Since empirical facts do not translate well into normative arguments (Tanasoca), I think that 
wrestling over empirical evidence about the positive or negative effects of ius sanguinis is not going to 
help us settle the normative questions about the justification of the principle of ius sanguinis. If we 
have strong moral reasons for maintaining ius sanguinis, we should endorse it regardless of how 
wrong it is applied in practice and how often this happens. Of course, we should adjust the ways in 
which to implement a morally justified principle to match changing empirical circumstances. Yet, the 
prior question is whether ius sanguinis can be morally justified as a principle of admission to 
citizenship.  
Why bother fixing ius sanguinis? 
Many contributors to this debate grant that ius sanguinis is a morally justified principle and propose 
ways to reform the ways in which we implement it. Bauböck, Ersbøll and Abrams argue that the 
ethno-nationalist disposition of ius sanguinis can be counterbalanced through adopting supplementary 
ius soli and residence-based naturalisation. Bauböck, Titshaw, Abrams and De Groot discuss 
possibilities of rethinking legal parentage in order to accommodate complex cases of citizenship 
determination in the context of ART birth.  
There is a broad consensus that ius sanguinis should be reformed, albeit disagreements prevail as to 
how and by whom. Bauböck’s proposals of ius filiationis, which reinterprets legal parenthood as a 
combination of genetic and social parenthood, is cheered by some but welcomed with scepticism by 
others. Titshaw and Collins, for example, worry that ius filiationis will not eliminate the uncertainty 
related to the determination of legal parentage and that it may also encourage abuse. Another 
contention is about the administrative level at which decisions about ius sanguinis should be taken. 
Writing in the context of the US federal system, Titshaw argues that fixing the family law will solve 
many problems related to legal parentage and therefore to ius sanguinis citizenship. Yet, Collins fears 
that leaving citizenship determination to those applying the family law will unwarrantedly expose 
citizenship to parochial concerns (e.g. immigration control). I think this is an important point, which 
we should consider beyond the level of administrative decision-making. I argue that the recognition of 
legal parentage and the determination of citizenship should not only be implemented through two 
separate procedures, but also regarded as two normative processes driven by distinct principles. While 
I appreciate the practical importance of the proposals for reforming ius sanguinis, I am not convinced 
that the strategy of fixing legal parentage addresses the prior and more fundamental question about the 
moral justification of ius sanguinis as a principle of admission to citizenship. 
It is surprising to me that in a debate about ius sanguinis citizenship so little is being said about 
citizenship. Most contributors seem to take for granted the normative link between parentage and 
citizenship and to give priority to instrumental arguments over normative ones. Let me explain this 
point by discussing three key arguments in support of ius sanguinis: (1) ius sanguinis protects children 
against statelessness; (2) ius sanguinis enables and protects family life; and (3) ius sanguinis expresses 
the social identity of the child. 
Preventing statelessness 
There is a wide consensus in the debate that children need (at least one) citizenship from birth and that 
ius sanguinis provides the ‘most simple and secure’ means (Ersbøll) to prevent statelessness. This 
view is accepted even by those who argue that birthright citizenship is ultimately an unfair 
arrangement (Swider and Vlieks). It is true that in today’ world the possession of the legal status of 
citizenship (aka nationality) predetermines access to a set of important rights and privileges, in the 
absence of which a person’s life is significantly constrained. It is also true that, despite a number of 
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complications caused by changing family patterns and the spread of assisted reproductive 
technologies, ius sanguinis still provides a relatively simple solution to tackle statelessness at birth. 
However, one can think of other ways to prevent statelessness that are equally convenient, as well as 
better justified normatively. 
The problem of statelessness could be arguably solved by a system of generalised unconditional ius 
soli or by a citizenship lottery in which new-borns are assigned randomly the citizenship of a state. 
These alternatives remove the uncertainties associated with the determination of legal parenthood for 
the purpose of ius sanguinis. However, convenience alone does not count for normative justification. 
Against the citizenship lottery suggestion, defenders of ius sanguinis would probably insist that new-
borns should receive the citizenship of ‘their’ parents. Notice that this is not an argument about 
convenience anymore but one about the importance of a shared citizenship between parents and 
children. But nothing in the argument about avoiding statelessness requires shared citizenship between 
parents and their children. To avoid statelessness at birth (in the absence of ius soli), it is sufficient that 
a child receives one citizenship from either of the parents. This means that in international families 
only one parent needs to transmit citizenship to the child and, if a parent has multiple citizenships, he 
or she needs to transfer only one these citizenships to the child. The argument about avoiding 
statelessness does not offer any guidance as to which citizenship should be shared between parents and 
children and why. 
Alternative solutions based on ius soli elements may offer better normative justifications. I argued 
elsewhere that states have a collective duty to grant access to a fundamental status of legal protection 
(nationality) to those born and living in their jurisdiction due to states’ joint participation in an 
international system that leaves individuals no real possibility of opting out, i.e. to establish a new 
citizenship or to remain stateless. My point here is not that the parent-child relationship has no 
normative implications for citizenship; it is merely that the argument about avoiding statelessness is 
unable to bring such normative concerns to the surface.  
Protecting family life 
The second major argument in defence of ius sanguinis is that the (automatic and immediate) 
transmission of citizenship from parent to child enables and protects family life. In the absence of a 
shared citizenship between parents and children, it is feared, family life would be severely disrupted as 
family members risk being separated from one another by borders and immigration restrictions. I do 
not contest that family life deserves special protection and that the legal recognition of parent-child 
relationship provides ‘critical protection for their [children’s] wellbeing’ (Abrams). However, I am not 
convinced that the automatic and immediate transfer of citizenship from parent to child is a major 
normative prerequisite of family life.  
It appears to me that the overwhelming majority of contributors subscribe to an indirect and 
instrumental defence of ius sanguinis. The biggest concern is about securing joint migration rights for 
family members, which are instrumental for family life. De Groot mentions two other important 
citizenship privileges, i.e. diplomatic and consular protection and political participation, but surrenders 
quickly to the concern about migration rights. The prevailing argument in these interventions is not so 
much a defence of ius sanguinis citizenship but a defence of ius migrationis sanguine – the right to 
migrate in virtue of a blood relationship. The downside of linking too tightly ius sanguinis to family 
migration rights is that the argument only holds as long as migration rights are strictly determined by 
citizenship status and as long as there are no other ways to secure migration rights for family members 
apart from ius sanguinis. Hence in a world of (more) open borders, where children would not be 
separated from their parents or siblings by migration restrictions, ius sanguinis citizenship loses its 
importance. However, a system of generalised family migration policies, such as the one suggested by 
Tanasoca, could provide the ‘permanence and stability’ (Titshaw) required for achieving meaningful 
family life in the absence of ius sanguinis citizenship. 
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Expressing social identity 
Another intriguing argument in defence of ius sanguinis rests on the idea that (birthright) citizenship is 
an important part of a child’s social identity. According to the judgement of the European Court of 
Human Right in the case Genovese v Malta, the failure to acquire a particular citizenship at birth is 
likely to affect negatively the identity of the child. I distinguish two versions of this argument: a 
softer/instrumental version, according to which the ius sanguinis principle ‘makes citizenship a part of 
citizens’ personal identities that they are like to accept’ (Bauböck); and a harder/essentialist version, 
for which the ius sanguinis principle recognises and confirms the (inherited) identity of the child.  
The essentialist version of the argument about a child’s social identity can be easily dismissed by 
pointing at the fact that citizenship is a contingent social and legal convention rather than a mechanism 
that confirms prior genetic, ethnic or cultural identities. Recall that in the Genovese case the Court 
used this argument in connection with the principle of non-discrimination. The failure to acquire 
citizenship via ius sanguinis by a child born out of wedlock will affect negatively his or her social 
identity because children born in wedlock do not face similar restrictions of ius sanguinis as children 
born out of wedlock. The situation can be remedied not only by removing the discriminatory treatment 
in the application of ius sanguinis but also by abolishing ius sanguinis altogether. The instrumental 
version of the identity argument is more interesting, not least because it supports our intuition that 
(birthright) citizens are likely to feel attached to their country of birth. However, this is valid for both 
ius sanguinis and ius soli, so the instrumental argument cannot show why we should preserve ius 
sanguinis or why we should chose one form of birthright citizenship over another.  
Long-lasting institutions usually shape people’s attitudes and generate attachments and identities. 
They acquire the kind of ‘quasi-naturalness’ that Bauböck ascribes to birthright citizenship. However, 
the test of time and familiarity is not a valid moral test because bad institutions can also acquire that 
kind of ‘magical power’ (Harder). We ought to question the moral foundations of deeply rooted 
institutions such as birthright citizenship especially because they are so popular and because they 
shape our identity.  
Opportunities for intergenerational membership 
There are several arguments in the debate that deal more seriously with normative aspects of ius 
sanguinis citizenship. I agree with Owen that the principle of ius nexi or genuine connection is the best 
we have for determining access to citizenship and that this general principle can be served by different 
policy arrangements, including some form of qualified ius sanguinis. I assume that the principle of 
‘appropriate citizenship’ defended by Swider and Vlieks goes along the same path. My concern with 
their proposal is that allowing for ‘a case-by-case evaluation of the individual situation of each 
newborn’ (Swider and Vlieks) might not serve well the commitment to avoid statelessness, which 
seems essential to the principle of appropriate citizenship.  
Honohan endorses the principle of genuine connection and defends a limited version of ius 
sanguinis by arguing for imposing restrictions to the intergenerational transmission of citizenship. She 
endorses ius sanguinis but proposes that citizenship be withdrawn from (adult) citizens who fail to 
develop a genuine link with the country. I am sympathetic to this proposal but I am not fully 
convinced about its underpinning justification. Honohan’s main objection to ius sanguinis, which is 
shared by Decimo and Harder, is that the unconditional acquisition of citizenship by children from 
their parents can amount to an unfair privilege. Although I acknowledge the implications of 
citizenship policies in today’s world characterised by sharp economic inequalities, I think that the 
concern with economic privilege should be disconnected from the concern about admission to 
citizenship. I agree with Bauböck that there are more appropriate means to fight global inequality and 
injustice than redistributing citizenship (e.g. economic redistribution, fairer migration policies). 
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Honohan rightly argues that citizenship ‘provides membership of a political community’ but she 
does not explain why children should be admitted in the political community of their parents rather 
than in another (e.g. the best political community). My answer is that both parents and children have 
an interest in the continued participation to a particular intergenerational political project. This interest 
can be served through providing opportunities for intergenerational membership in the form of 
provisional ius sanguinis. The citizenship acquired provisionally at birth should be withdrawn upon 
majority from those (provisional) citizens who do not have a genuine link with the country. However, 
if a person fails to prove a genuine link with at least one country, his or her provisional citizenship 
should still be extended but only in the form of formal legal membership, i.e. without political rights. 
Notice that the argument for intergenerational provisional citizenship stands even after we solve the 
problems related to the recognition of parenthood and to migration restriction for family members. 
Bauböck points at this when talking about the ‘signalling effects of birthright citizenship’ but his 
argument slides into an instrumental and collectivist defence of birthright citizenship. My argument 
for intergenerational citizenship puts emphasis on the individual interests in continued political 
membership. Incidentally, this solution is also likely to have positive implications for the political 
community as a whole, e.g. by fostering ‘a sense of responsibility towards the common good and 
future generations’ (Bauböck). I am sympathetic to Harder’s idea of political membership as a ‘lively 
on-going process of negotiation in which everyone has a stake’. However, I disagree that admission to 
political membership should be entirely up to negotiation, as I maintain that there are certain concerns 
that demand inclusion regardless of people’s preferences and abilities. I also no not think that political 
membership should be ‘limited by our mortality’ (Harder). While I reject continuation based on 
genetic, ethnic and racial traits or simply convenience, I argue that there should be opportunities for 
intergenerational political continuity, which can be provided through provisional ius sanguinis. 
It is beyond dispute that any attempt to dislodge a deeply rooted and widespread institution such as 
ius sanguinis is bound to pose serious practical challenges. However, if one has compelling moral 
reasons for dismantling such an institution, one ought to work towards this end. Babies are born into a 
physical world and from actual bodies but they are not naturally born into families and citizenship. 
The latter are social conventions that demand our acceptance when they are justified and our courage 
to change and replace them when they are not. To my critics worried that abolishing ius sanguinis 
amounts to throwing out the baby with the dirty bathwater I reply that we should not put the baby in 
the dirty bathwater in the first place. 
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